Moderates killed in Pakistan’s ‘soft coup’ January 24, 2012
Posted by Malik Siraj Akbar in FYI, Malik Siraj Akbar, Press Freedom.Tags: Christina Lamb, Committee to Protect Journalists, Husain Haqqani, intelligence arm, Malik Siraj Akbar asylum, Memogate, Moderates killed in Pakistan’s ‘soft coup’, Mukarram Khan Atif, Najam Sethi, pakistani journalists, progressive elements, Saleem Shahzad, Salmaan Taseer, salman taseer
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(NOTE: The internationally acclaimed war correspondent Christina Lamb of the Sunday Times, London, interviewed me for her following article about the increasing attacks on moderate and progressive elements in Pakistan.
I am reproducing the piece here for your reading as you will have no access to the original article until you are a subscriber to the Sunday Times. A shorter news version of this story appeared in Pakistan’s The News International on January 23, 2012.)
By Christina Lamb for the Sunday Times, London. Published: 22 January 2012
Mukarram Khan Atif was praying in his mosque near Peshawar just after sunset last Tuesday when two gunmen walked in, dragged him outside and shot him dead.
The murder of the radio journalist by the Pakistan Taliban was shocking in its brutality and brazenness.
It was the latest killing in what many describe as a deliberate campaign by the country’s military intelligence arm (ISI) and militant groups to silence moderate voices amid a growing crisis between government and the country’s powerful military.
MK, as he was known, who worked for Voice of America and was shortly to remarry, had been receiving death threats from militants who did not like his reporting and demanded space on his radio programmes, according to his colleague Babar Baig, but was “very bold and active”.
“We’re definitely seeing a deliberate attempt to silence people,” said Bob Dietz, Asia director of the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists. “Scores of Pakistani journalists have asked for asylum, wanting us to arrange fellowships. Frankly, we’re overwhelmed by it.”
Not only has Pakistan been the deadliest country for journalists for the past two years but the last year has seen the killing of Salman Taseer, the Punjab governor, and Shahbaz Bhatti, a government minister. Taseer’s son Shahzad has been missing since he was abducted last August.
Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s former ambassador to America, is in hiding in the prime minister’s house, facing trial for treason on charges widely regarded as trumped up. He says his life is in danger.
His wife, Farahnaz Ispahani, President Asif Zardari’s spokesman, has fled to Washington amid fears that ISI might kidnap her to force her husband to sign a confession and implicate the president.
“What we’re seeing is the systematic killing or silencing of anyone who stands up to the institutionalisation of a militarised Islamist state, who advocates positive relations with the West or stands up for tolerance,” she said.
“I’m scared. The government can’t even protect itself.”
Tensions have grown since the killing of Osama Bin Laden in May. The raid on the town of Abbottabad by US Navy Seals left the Pakistan military a laughing stock, pilloried at home for failing to detect four American helicopters carrying out a 40-minute commando operation a mile away from the main military college.
ISI, in turn, was furious at what it saw as the government’s failure to defend it.
When Mansoor Ijaz, a Pakistani businessman based in America, claimed he and Haqqani had concocted a memo calling for American help in reining in ISI, the army seized on it. It demanded that Haqqani, who had once written a critical book about the military, be sacked as ambassador.
Haqqani denied involvement and flew home to clear his name, only for his passport to be seized. The so-called Memogate scandal has prompted a crisis that many have described as “a soft coup”.
Last week Yousuf Raza Gilani, Pakistan’s prime minister, was charged with contempt of court for not pursuing a court order to reopen old corruption charges against his boss, Zardari. Yet, while the courts pursue such issues, there has been impunity for those who kill journalists. A few weeks after Bin Laden’s death, a reporter called Saleem Shahzad, who was investigating links between the military and Al-Qaeda, was abducted by ISI. A few days later, the 40-year-old father of three was found in a ditch, beaten to death.
An international outcry prompted a rare commission of inquiry, which released its report last week. It apportioned no blame but stated: “The commission is convinced that there are sufficient reasons to believe that the agencies, including ISI, have been using coercive and intimidating tactics in dealing with journalists who antagonise the agency’s interest.”
It is not just journalists who are at risk. Ali Dayan Hasan, the Pakistan director of Human Rights Watch, had to move his family to Britain last year after threats to them.
Using children is another tactic of intimidation. One journalist who reported on Kashmiri militants had his teenage son abducted as he left school more than a year ago. He says ISI is holding him, and his wife has been allowed a 10-minute visit. They are scared to go public in case the boy is killed.
Malik Siraj Akbar, editor of an online newspaper in Baluchistan, which is in the grip of bloody insurgency between the army and nationalists, won asylum in America last November to escape threats.
“It’s very difficult when you’re constantly followed, your phones are tapped and you get all these threatening phone calls,” he said. “I’d come out of the barber’s and they’d immediately call and say ‘Nice haircut’.”
He believes far more journalists are being killed than reported. “At least eight of my journalist friends were killed last year,” he said.
He decided to move to America and continues to publish his newspaper, although it is blocked in Pakistan. “I never wanted to leave my country, but I don’t want to become a martyr,” he said.
Among those who have publicly raised the issue are Najam Sethi, editor of The Friday Times and host of a popular political television show, and his wife and co- editor, Jugnu Mohsin. After years of threats, the intimidation became so severe last year that they were forced to move to Washington for a couple of months.
“In the old days you’d get picked up, thrown into prison for a couple of months, maybe roughed up, then let out. But now it’s a whole different ball game — there’s no second chance,” said Sethi.
The couple returned home to Lahore a month ago after his employers built a studio in their house so they would not need to go out, and the local government gave them eight round-the-clock police guards.
After a wave of accusations on social media sites that he and his daughter were CIA spies, Sethi decided to go public, describing the threats as “from both state and non-state actors, including extremists”. He said he had given specific information to media watchdogs at home and abroad “so if we were harmed they would know who had done it”. (Courtesy: The Sunday Times, London)
In US, Analysts Fear for Haqqani’s Safety January 16, 2012
Posted by Malik Siraj Akbar in Reporting.Tags: due process of law, hillary rodham clinton, Husain Haqqani, joseph i lieberman, Malik Siraj Akbar, Memogate, memogate scandal, mike mullen, victoria nuland
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By Malik Siraj Akbar
When the ‘memogate’ scandal story first broke, the now infamous memo was dismissed by the US media as an unimportant piece of paper – a reaction similar to that of the former US Chairman of Joints Chief of Staff Mike Mullen. The turn of the year, however, has brought a change in the hawkish US media’s take on the scandal. The ‘unimportant piece of paper’ has triggered heated discussions which are punctuated with fear of derailment of Pakistan’s scrawny democracy and safety of the ‘pro-US’ former ambassador Husain Haqqani.
On January 7, a group of sixteen leading US scholars, whose work focuses on South Asia, collectively signed a letter which was addressed to US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to “express our deep concern over the safety and well-being of former Pakistani Ambassador to the US Husain Haqqani.” The signatories urged the US government to “continue to weigh-in with key Pakistani leaders, make appropriate public statements to ensure that Husain Haqqani is not physically harmed, and that due process of law is followed.”
The expression of sympathy with the former envoy comes in the wake of a similar joint statement issued earlier by influential senators John McCain (Arizona), Mark Steven Kirk (Illinois) and Joseph I. Lieberman (Connecticut). Although the US government had initially avoided commenting on the memogate, Victoria Nuland, the State Department Spokeswoman, subsequently demanded a “fair and transparent” process for the journalist-turned-diplomat.
Prior to his appointment as Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington, Haqqani – who taught international relations at the Boston University – was considered as one of the most well-connected Pakistanis in the US media, academia and government. Despite living in conditions that he described to the New York Times as “essentially like a house arrest,” Haqqani enjoyed admiration and support among articulate professionals in the US capital.
“Finding Husain guilty of treason is like finding democracy guilty of treason,” Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Stimson Center, told Dawn.com. An author and editor of 13 books and more than 350 articles, Krepon said he was concerned for Haqqani’s safety as he viewed politics in Pakistan as a “blood sport” where it can be insufficient to castrate someone who holds a threatening political view.
“Worse penalties,” he remembered, “have been imposed.”
Meanwhile, Georgetown University assistant professor Christine Fair said being appointed Pakistan’s ambassador to the US was the ‘worst job in the world.’
Fair, who has known Haqqani as a professional colleague for 10 years, recalled the latter’s dilemma on how he was seen as either a diplomat who was making excuses for a perfidious ally in DC, or in Pakistan as someone who was selling his country’s sovereignty to the Americans.
On his part, Haqqani impressed – if not fully convinced – Americans with his diplomacy during one of lowest times in the history of Pak-US relations following the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011, which publicly questioned Pakistan’s commitment to the war on terror and demanded an explanation for its alleged complicity in harbouring the world’s most dreaded terrorist.
Haqqani knew America better than many educated Americans. He spoke lucid English and generously quoted American journals in his talks. Some say he admired America more than Americans themselves.
“If Husain was not Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington during this period, the bilateral relationship would have simply melted down in the aftermath of the Raymond Davis affair,” said Ashley J. Tellis, a senior associate at the DC-headquartered foreign policy think-tank the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Tellis, who was intimately involved in negotiating America’s civil nuclear agreement with India, said some Pakistani ambassadors had done a remarkable job in the past defending “special interests” in Pakistan — especially the Army but Haqqani ranked among the few “who stood so clearly and fearlessly for the liberal Pakistan.”
Fair, who also signed the letter to Secretary Clinton, insisted that the signatories’ engagement is not all about Haqqani, “It is about the survival of Pakistan’s fragile democracy under the grinding assault of a jingoistic press, an overbearing military and an over-reaching Supreme Court.”
She questioned the process under which Haqqani became the focus of the memogate scandal. Referring to US businessman Mansoor Ijaz’s disclosure about the ISI chief General Shuja Pasha’s meeting in the Gulf to seek permission to sack President Asif Ali Zardari, Fair insisted that Haqqani’s actions, even if proven to be true, do not amount to treason under article VI of Pakistan’s constitution. However, Pasha’s efforts could qualify as treason because the ISI Director General does not have any authority to seek the removal of the president.
Besides worrying for his safety, Haqqani’s friends in DC are also dissatisfied with the legal representation offered to the former diplomat.
Having once jointly authored a paper with Haqqani, Tellis of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said he fears for the troubled ambassador under the “highly charged atmosphere” in Pakistan, and because “he is without legal representation at a time when he is embroiled in a Kafkaesque tragedy that entails a denial of all due process.”
Tellis suggested that the US government demand for Haqqani the permission to travel freely because he had voluntarily returned to Pakistan. “The current judicial enquiry, which is little but a political farce with no constitutional standing, should end.”
While American scholars continue to passionately seek a fair trial for Haqqani, no such activism has been seen initiated on behalf of Pakistani-American scholars and journalists.
Explaining the reason for absolute indifference on the part of the US-based Pakistani intellectuals toward this issue, one observer, who requested anonymity, cited Haqqani’s contempt for fellow Pakistani journalists and writers as the main cause of lack of support for him.
“Husain cultivated extensive relationships among Americans but he deliberately distanced himself from Pakistani scholars. He wasted no time and opportunity ridiculing and questioning the credentials and professionalism of Pakistani media persons. He earned as many opponents in Pakistani media as he made friends among Americans,” said the observer.
Insiders said Pakistani television anchorpersons were an anathema to Haqqani and he would publicly mention how “doctors have become journalists in Pakistan,” alluding to a popular talk-show host. As the ambassador, some journalists complain, Haqqani tried, without much success, to influence the editorial policy of certain media outlets, including the Urdu service of the Voice of America.
Support for Haqqani from US senators, the State Department and scholars may also backfire in Pakistan, a country with extremely charged anti-American sentiments. The right-media and Haqqani’s opponents will probably manipulate such expression of solidarity as a confirmation of his being an “American agent”.
Haqqani’s intellectual friends said they were mindful of this concern while drafting their letter to Secretary Clinton.
“There was certainly the risk that Haqqani’s enemies will use the letter to argue that he is too close to the Americans,” admitted another signatory of the letter, Lisa Curtis, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington DC.
“We felt the potential benefits of raising greater awareness on Haqqani’s case outweighed the potential downsides of showing support for him. Remaining silent and cautious on his treatment no longer seemed like the appropriate response to developments inside Pakistan.”
Curtis, who met Haqqani when she was an American diplomat serving in Pakistan in the mid-1990s while the latter was Information Minister in the second Bhutto administration, said the US government should continue to monitor Haqqani’s case as it does other human rights-related cases throughout the world.
“In a country like Pakistan, where those who speak out in favor of fundamental concepts of democracy, like tolerance and pluralism, are increasingly under threat from religious extremists, it becomes even more important for the US to stand up for democratic ideals.”
Whatever attention the memogate scandal has received in DC is mainly because of Ambassador Haqqani’s alleged involvement and his current plight. This episode does not only potentially debunk the civil-military strife in Pakistan but also questions the limits of American influence into Pakistan’s ‘internal matters.’ (Courtesy: Dawn.com)
The author is a freelance journalist based in Washington DC
Balochistan a Hornet’s Nest for Journalists January 15, 2012
Posted by Malik Siraj Akbar in Malik Siraj Akbar, Press Freedom.Tags: By Zofeen Ebrahim, Malik Siraj Akbar, press freedom in Balochistan, Shahzada Zulfiqar, Zofeen Ebrahim
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By Zofeen Ebrahim
KARACHI, Jan 11, 2012 (IPS) - “This could well be my last interview.” There was audible nervousness in Jamal Tarakai’s voice as it crackled over the telephone line from the city of Quetta. The thirty-five-year-old journalist, hailing from the restive Balochistan province in Pakistan, believes he could be killed at any time.
His fear is not unfounded. Over the last two years the press in Balochistan have weathered a bloody wave of violence.
In 2011 alone, ten journalists from the province were killed in their ‘line of duty’. Three lost their lives in explosions or in crossfire between armed groups and security forces, while the other seven were gunned down in blatant assassinations.
“If somebody would guarantee me my life, I would quit this profession in a second,” Tarakai told IPS. He rues the fateful day in May 2011 when he filmed the tragic slaughter of five unarmed foreigners (one of them a seven-month pregnant woman) at the hands of Pakistan’s security forces, near his home in Kharotabad, a public square in Quetta.
Another Quetta-based journalist, Shahzad Baloch, wrote in the English daily Express Tribune on Nov 6, 2011 that his colleagues lost their lives “because of their professional work or perceived sympathies with the province’s suffering citizens.”
The largest and most under-developed of Pakistan’s provinces, Balochistan has, of late, come under the news radar for its ongoing insurgency.
The presence of the Quetta Shura (a militant organisation composed of top leadership of the Afghan Taliban and believed to have been based in the city of Quetta since 2001) has prompted army intervention in the province. Continued kidnappings, numerous discoveries of bullet-riddled and tortured bodies of nationalists, as well as the targeted massacre of an ethnic Muslim minority group, have recently been making national and international headlines.
“With a tribal culture, several separatist and religious groups, intelligence agencies and the security forces, (Balochistan) has become one of the most difficult places for journalists to report from,” Tarakai said.
“Intelligence agencies chase and hound you for talking to western diplomats. They want to know exactly what transpired,” said Shahzada Zulfikar, who works as a stringer for various national and international news organisations.
“In addition, we are caught in the crossfire between various groups,” he added.
Malik Siraj Akbar, a young journalist from Balochistan who recently sought asylum after “receiving threats from the state intelligence agencies” believes journalists in other conflict areas of Pakistan, like the northern Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), are much safer.
In the FATA, Akbar told IPS, there were only Islamists fighting the army in a ‘defined’ conflict.
“In Balochistan, in contrast, there is guerilla warfare. There are at least five Baloch armed groups fighting the security forces. In addition, there are intelligence agencies, paramilitary forces and five anti-nationalists groups and some militant religious groups as well. In all, a journalist faces threats from at least fifteen groups, notwithstanding individuals like the powerful tribal chiefs, parliamentarians, senators, and drug dealers,” he added grimly.
Journalists, therefore, find it almost impossible to keep out of everyone’s hair.
“Sometimes armed nationalist groups claim they have killed over a dozen paramilitary men. This is often vehemently denied by the latter’s spokesmen. If the newspapers don’t publish the report, the nationalist groups call them ‘government agents’ and puppets; on the other hand, if the report gets published, the government and army get annoyed, claiming the reporter and the news organisation are glorifying the insurgency,” Akbar explained to IPS over Skype from Washington D.C.
He told IPS that in the last two years alone, newspapers in Balochistan had stopped publishing editorials and op-ed columns.
“We had excellent op-ed pages and there would be serious debate and good articles. All that is dead now,” he lamented.
Akbar also said that many newspapers used to write openly about missing persons but since the “kill and dump” policy came into effect, along with the rise of anti- nationalist groups, coverage has been throttled.
Not only do newspapers come under fire for printing photos and reports, but certain ‘trigger’ terms and phrases also incite the wrath of various armed actors.
“Terms like ‘martyr’, ‘freedom fighter’ or ‘insurgent’, whether the Baloch stands for ‘independence’ or ‘autonomy’…writing on the insurgency is not easy,” Akbar said.
In another example, he said that Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a banned religious group, expects copy editors to refer to the Shias (a Muslim religious minority) as ‘infidels’. “And if the word is changed or altered, the newspaper receives threats,” Akbar complained.
He said this situation has endangered the “life of every educated young Baloch.”
Several journalists refused to discuss the issue with IPS over the phone, either because they believed their phones were tapped or simply because talking about the crisis has become too dangerous.
Getting threatening calls and text messages from unknown numbers has become a norm for them.
“(No one) physically stops you from writing anything, they just say you will face the consequences of your activity. That is enough to put the fear of God in you,” said Zulfikar. The unknown enemy, according to these journalists, can be among either state or anti-state elements. “Not a single perpetrator has been brought to justice,” said Riaz Mengal, president of the Balochistan Tribal Union of Journalists. He met the ire of a feudal lord, who is also the son of a former minister, who had him kidnapped back in 2007 after Mengal published a story about the illegal trade of smuggled vehicles.
“If the government and the intelligence agencies want to, they can trace the killers,” said Tarakai.
But according to Akbar, those very government forces that are tasked with delivering justice are themselves responsible for many of the atrocities unfolding across the region.
“It is an open secret that the militant groups who killed journalists have been patronised by the army’s intelligence agencies,” he said.
Mengal, hailing from the Khuzdar district, is one of eight journalists who, until two months ago, was on the hit-list of an underground militant outfit known as the Baloch Musallah Defah Army (BDMA), which had earlier claimed responsibility for the killing of two Khuzdar journalists, Mohammad Khan Sasoli and Munir Shakir.
“After what happened to our colleagues, we never take such threats lightly,” Mengal said. In fact, all eight journalists publicly announced their intention to quit the profession. Though the militant group withdrew its hit-list following appeals from tribal leaders and politicians, Mengal insisted, “We are scared stiff.”
Meanwhile Tarakai’s anxiety has grown significantly since Dr. Baqir Shah, who performed autopsies on the foreigners killed in Kharotabad, was murdered. Shah had contradicted police reports suggesting that the foreigners were suicide bombers and he paid for the truth with his life.
“I am next,” Tarakai said. “I was one of the few witnesses to the episode and appeared before the inquiry committee set up by the court.”
The young journalist’s disquiet is palpable. Even the two armed guards provided by the government to protect him have left him because “they thought (being associated with) me meant their lives were not safe either,” Tarakai said. (Courtesy: IPS)
The Future of Pakistan January 15, 2012
Posted by Malik Siraj Akbar in Interviews, Malik Siraj Akbar.Tags: Brookings Institution, Malik Siraj Akbar, Pakistan Army, Pervez Musharraf, Stephen P. Cohen, The future of Pakistan, the Idea of Pakistan, US-Pakistan relations, war on terrorism
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By Malik Siraj Akbar
Dr Stephen P Cohen, a Senior Fellow at the Washington DC-based think tank the Brookings Institution, is considered as the ‘dean of the Pakistan experts’. He is known as one of the world’s most trusted authorities on the Pakistani military and its relationship with the civilian governments.
Author of Pakistan Army and the Idea of Pakistan, Dr Cohen recently edited a new book called The Future of Pakistan. The 325-page book focuses on a number of challenges Pakistan currently faces. Here are excerpts from a conversation with Dr Cohen about the predictions the book makes about Pakistan’s future.
Some of the best experts on Pakistan contribute to your book The Future of Pakistan. Why did you choose this title?
The book does not look at yesterday or today, but the day after tomorrow by examining the factors and variables which will influence the future of Pakistan. I became more concerned after publishing my 2004 book, The Idea of Pakistan, as many of its more pessimistic judgments were coming true. So, I invited some of the best scholars on the subject to share their ideas. All of them expressed concern about the existing situation. Most seemed to agree, however, that Pakistan would not experience major transformation in the next five to seven years. We did not try to look beyond that.
In my chapter, I paid special attention to the decline of the Pakistani state. The more I looked, the more pessimistic I became.
You say you did not want to offend your Pakistani friends while writing this book but you also insist that a hurtful truth is better than a pleasant lie. What are these hurtful truths about Pakistan that you think need to be told now?
One was that General Pervez Musharraf fooled himself and he fooled everyone else. He lacked toughness, he tried to please everyone. He was not capable of leading Pakistan’s liberal transformation, although he personally held a liberal vision of the future. Some Pakistanis and many Americans thought that Musharraf was the last hope for Pakistan. I disagree, there are a lot of good Pakistanis around, both in the military and outside of it. However,the army can’t govern the country effectively but it won’t let others govern it either. This is the governance dilemma. Pakistan is stuck between being an outright military dictatorship and a stable democracy. Neither are likely, and an even less likely future would be a radical transformation and the rise of Islamists or a breakaway movement led by the Baloch or other separatist groups. We did not see this coming soon, yet with the obvious breakdown of law and order, the decline of the economy, as well as a dysfunctional civilian-military relationship — change seems to be in the wind — but few of us can be precise about what that change will be. Pakistan is muddling through, but change and transformation are coming, I just don’t know when or how.
Weakness in governance, education, and the absence of land reform made Pakistan a victim of contemporary globalisation. It doesn’t make much that anyone wants to buy, and it is cut off from its natural regional trading partners. Yet, the negative aspects of Islamist globalisation have hit Pakistan hard. Some of the weirdest ideas in the Islamic world have found rich soil in Pakistan, and the country is regarded as an epicentre of terrorism. Pakistan, which was once held up as the most moderate of the Islamic states, seems to be embracing extremists and their dysfunctional violent ideas.
Is Pakistan on the verge of collapse?
No, it is not going to collapse. The military will ensure that the state will not collapse. It is not a country in need of critical support for its survival but it may yet happen some day, especially if the economy collapses.
Pakistan has to make a breakthrough and become a South Asian country. It should join India in a number of cooperative ventures while protecting its sovereignty against foreign interests and intrusions.
The Indians tend to be bullying when it comes to their neighbours, but Pakistanis are capable of defending their interests. Many Indians are ready for a change now. India sees itself as a major rising Asian state and Pakistan is a drag on it.
Yet, because of nuclearisation India can’t conceive of finishing off Pakistan. The only realistic option for India is cooperation. Islamabad’s decision to grant India the most favoured nation (MFN) status offers an opportunity to both countries; will it lead to a peace process? I don’t know, but their dilemma is that they cannot live with each other and they cannot live without each other. They need to cooperate along several dimensions, there is no military solution for the problems each has with the other.
Why do you call Pakistan a major foreign policy headache for the United States?
In the book I quote an American who said we assumed that with all our aid and alliances we believed that Pakistan would emerge as an independent democratic state. However, it turned out that India, which did not get our military assistance and partnership, has emerged as that kind of country.
The Pakistanis, particularly the military, have a hard time looking around for role models. Turkey, Indonesia or Malaysia may not be the perfect role models for Pakistan. Perhaps the best political role model for you is India which is also a diverse South Asian state, but now with a stable political order and growing economic power. In India, the military has a legitimate role but still remains under the government’s control.
It is the responsibility of the Pakistani civilian government to find a legitimate role for the Pakistani army, and the army must help in that search, the present arrangement is not working.
You say you don’t know where Pakistan is heading to but once it gets there you will explain why it was inevitable.
I quoted a former US ambassador to the Soviet Union who said, “I don’t know what is going to happen to the Soviet Union but when it does happen I will tell you exactly why it was inevitable.” So, looking ahead at Pakistan’s future, we don’t know what is going to happen to Pakistan but we know something alarming is happening to it. Pakistan will remain, but its identity is changing.
As for America’s mixed role in Pakistan, there were two areas where we should have been more accommodating. First, we should have recognised Pakistan as a nuclear power after it tested its weapons in 1998 — as we did with the Indians. This would have legitimised the Pakistani nuclear programme and reduced the paranoia that the Americans were trying to deprive them of their nuclear capability; it might also have contributed to more responsible Pakistani nuclear policy, right now it is the fastest growing nuclear weapons state in the world — and one with a bad record of transferring nuclear technology in the past. Second, the US should have provided trade opportunities, instead of only military aid, to Pakistan after 9/11. There was a serious Pakistani interest in increasing trade, not just receiving military aid; the US did not respond to this.
How can Pakistan get out of what you call the burden of its history and narrative of victimhood?
First, economic trade between Pakistan and the rest of South Asia should be encouraged. It should hook up with India, one of the fastest growing economies in the world, as well as continue its ties with China. The Iran-Pakistan-Indian pipeline is a good idea and I am baffled why the Americans have always opposed it. Yes, it will help the Iranians, but the pipeline will also help the Afghans, the Indians and the Pakistanis. In my math, three positives outweigh one negative.
Second, Pakistani governments have been cowardly in dealing with those who oppose modernity and try to push the country back to the seventh century. Perhaps the cowardice comes from the fact that the state uses some of these groups for its own strategic purposes, a fatal and self-defeating miscalculation.
Why do you argue that the Pakistani military has neither run the country effectively nor allowed others to run it?
Well, because they are not trained to be economists or how to run businesses although the military manages a lot of businesses once they retire. They are not trained to be politicians. Being a politician is a difficult skill to acquire. People cannot be ordered about, especially Pakistanis. As a politician, you have to find common interests by working with people who dislike each other; Pakistan needs to develop a true political class.
In Pakistan, the military has identified enemies among its fellow-citizens. If you demonise your own people, you are in deep trouble. I mean you can’t treat the Bengalis or the Baloch, or other ethnic or religious minorities the way you treat foreign enemies. That’s the route to catastrophe, as we have seen both in Pakistan and other countries that have given up on pluralism and tolerance and headed down the road to self-destruction.
Of Pakistan’s military leaders, Ayub Khan tried to act as a politician but failed because he could not address two deeper problems, education and land reforms. If you look at the East Asian tigers, they all dealt with land reforms early and invested heavily in education at all levels. Even China has done this, albeit through totalitarian coercion, which would not work in pluralistic Pakistan.
How much influence will Islam and the army continue to exercise on the future of Pakistan?
I like the idea of seeing Islamic parties getting a chance to govern, and then discovering whether they succeed or fail. I’d also like to see somebody like Imran Khan get elected — not that I am a particular fan of his, but let him get elected and assume the burden and responsibilities of governance, and be held accountable. Let him succeed or fail on these terms.
I had a conversation with Musharraf right after his coup and told him that while the obviously corrupt and extremist political leaders had to be held accountable, that he should also hold elections and let the democratic process move forward. He responded to the effect that he was going to fix the system once and for all. I knew then he was in deep trouble. In a normal state you have to allow people to fail. They must run for office, get elected and then fail on their own terms. It should be left to the people of Pakistan to decide who they elect to rule them. In the long run, they will make the right decision, but the courts, the press, and, rarely, even the military, will be around to prevent disaster. Failure should be seen as helping to perfect the system, not a sign of a bad system. The cure for bad democracy is more and better democracy, not an incompetent military regime, which only breeds resentment as it covers up its failures. In Pakistan the mentality seems to be that having won an election, the victor can persecute his or political rivals. I’d prefer a moderate competent military regime to this kind of pseudo democracy.
How is failure in Afghanistan going to affect Pakistan?
If the Taliban come back to power or if they play a significant role in the future dispensation, there will be a major blowback on Pakistan. We may yet see how the government of Pakistan responds to the Taliban mindset which says that ‘we [Taliban] have defeated one superpower, the United States, in Afghanistan and now we will take control of Pakistan and then India.’ This is a revolutionary movement that has to be contained and stopped, not provided with safe-haven and political support. Staying away from Bonn was a strategic gaffe that put Pakistan on the opposite side of virtually the entire world.
What are some of the future scenarios and options you discuss in the book about Pakistan?
Some American experts are talking about containing Pakistan. This is premature language, but if Pakistan pursues policies which are hostile to American interests in Afghanistan and if they support terrorism then we might move to a policy of containment . This would have two dimensions: erecting a military barrier while supporting internal transformation. I don’t know about containing Pakistan militarily, it seems to be pursing self-defeating policies in any case, but I support the latter kind of policy. America’s goal should be a normal Pakistan.
What should or can be done to immediately bring Pakistan into what you call a ‘normal state category’?
The long-term key to normalising Pakistan is India. The fear of India drives the Pakistan army and the army drives Pakistan. If India can normalise with Pakistan in one way or the other, then Pakistan can devote its resources and energy to becoming a more attractive and respected country.
What are the warning signs and revolutionary options for Pakistan?
An interesting part of the book is where I compare Pakistan with a number of other states. Pakistan is unlikely to follow the Iranian model of a clergy-led revolution because the army in Pakistan is stronger than its counterpart was in Iran. The negative case for Pakistan would be that of Tsarist Russia where the country was destabilised by World War I, the army fell apart and Russia’s ruling nobility had no credibility, and revolutionary groups filled the gap. There are also other bad examples like the Balkans or Yugoslavia, or interwar Japan, where the military pursued fatally self-destructive policies vis-a-vis the West and China.
Never in history have we seen a country so big with so many nuclear weapons in this kind of trouble. When the Chinese went through their cultural revolution, they did not have nuclear weapons. Hence, people were not much afraid of China. When the Soviet Union disintegrated and became Russia, they knew they wanted to become Europeans. Pakistanis should now decide to become South Asians by becoming once again a part of South Asia.
Can China become an alternative strategic partner of Pakistan to replace the US?
If the Chinese could teach Pakistan how to become an economic power, that would be great. Yet, the Chinese are not going to teach Pakistan how to become a democracy. Given Pakistan’s complexity and social diversity, democracy is a good system for it because it allows most people to have a say in the affairs of the state. You can’t run Pakistan from the centre. The army has tried that many times but has failed. After every military takeover, they called back the civilians within three years. On the political front, China is not a role model for Pakistan.
Out of nukes, huge population and geostrategic location, what worries the world the most about an unstable Pakistan?
The nuclear weapons are probably under responsible control. If Pakistan breaks down or some separatist movements succeed, as happened in 1971, then we’ll begin to worry about the nuclear weapons. Pakistan, like North Korea, is “too nuclear to fail,” that is, no one wants to see a real nuclear weapons state disintegrate.
Also Pakistan, like North Korea, uses its nuclear asset and its political fragility as a means to extract concessions from other countries. We’ve contributed to this begging-bowl syndrome, for years. The US should provide aid to Pakistan but link it to more concrete reforms in education, administration, and democratisation. Otherwise we are wasting our time and money. I don’t like the term ‘trust deficit’; trust will grow when there are clear — and public — links between our respective obligations over time.
(Malik Siraj Akbar is a freelance journalist based in Washington DC.)
This Interview Was Originally Published in the Sunday Magazine of The Express Tribune, Pakistan, on Sunday Magazine, January 15th, 2012
Balochistan — Point of No Return? January 11, 2012
Posted by Malik Siraj Akbar in Malik Siraj Akbar.Tags: Balochistan, Balochistan — Point of No Return?, chief justice of pakistan, durable peace, Malik Siraj Akbar, Malik Siraj Akbar article in Express Tribune, Nawaz Sharif, pml n, Sardar Attaullah Mengal, target killing of Punjabi settlers in Balochistan, violation of human rights
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By Malik Siraj Akbar
Sardar Ataullah Mengal, Balochistan’s first chief minister, recently said after a meeting with PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif that the situation in Balochistan had reached a “point of no return”, adding that he had “no control” over the disillusioned Baloch youths who had taken to the hills to wage a war of liberation. The Baloch are angry with Nawaz Sharif, Imran Khan and the Jamaat-e-Islami. The above three, they complain, organise marches against US foreign policy or in support of Palestine but they do not stage similar long marches in major cities like Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi to condemn the military’s violation of human rights in Balochistan.
The Baloch feel betrayed by the judiciary’s silence over the ‘kill and dump’ operations going on in the province. Although the Chief Justice of Pakistan is a native of Balochistan, the apex court seems to have abstained from playing a proactive role in halting the killing and dumping of those who disappear in the province. Perhaps, the army chief should sanction an independent inquiry into the cases of the missing persons.
The federal government should undertake a comprehensive list of confidence-building measures to bring Balochistan back from the ‘point of no return’. These should include economic and constitutional packages and will have to be implemented over a long period of time.
For instance, the federal government should make sure that no Baloch activist is arrested or killed for at least one year. This may look difficult at this point but it is extremely important for both sides to prove their commitment to a durable peace within a specified time frame. Another possible breakthrough can come forward if the military announces a unilateral end to its operations in the province.
Here are some responsibilities the Baloch nationalists should also own. They should remain assured that they have a genuine and convincing case of being subjected to oppression, therefore, they do not need to exaggerate these injustices. Exaggeration can hinder the resolution of political disputes through peaceful negotiations. The Baloch could have presented a strong case on any forum without foolishly resorting to killing unarmed Punjabi settlers in Balochistan. These killings have tremendously undermined the legitimacy of their struggle. A lot of Baloch leaders and activists justify these killings by terming them as a ‘reaction’ to the military’s brutalities.
Anti-Punjabi rhetoric can serve as a catalyst to garner support from disgruntled political activists but it cannot serve any long-term interest for a political movement. National movements need more sophisticated philosophical and ideological foundations. An intrinsic element of the Baloch culture is the centuries-old concept of bahot (protection) which means to protect the life of a ‘settler’ or an ‘outsider’ who comes to a Baloch area. Throughout Baloch history, we have not seen such brazen attacks on ‘outsiders’ on Baloch land as witnessed after the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti. These attacks clearly contradict the Baloch code of conduct, known as Balochiat¸ and they also alienate supporters of Balochistan who live outside the province and the country. Will the real progressive Baloch leaders stand up and apologise to the families of Punjabi settlers who were unjustly killed?
Today, criticising certain Baloch leaders is considered almost blasphemous and this closed the doors for dissenting ideas. The young Baloch believes his leader can’t err. Yet, in my judgment, the very leaders who galvanised the middle class Baloch youths, lack the political acumen and the vision to provide their followers and the rest of the world a clear roadmap for maximum autonomy or an independent Balochistan. When leaders are caught up in a situation where they have maximalist demands but no vision of how to achieve their goals, they end up getting all their soldiers arrested or killed.
Lastly, the Baloch and the centre need constant and long-term engagement. They must, at least, be clear about what they stand for instead of eternally and fatally fighting without making an inch of progress toward their desired destinations.
This Article Was Originally Published in The Express Tribune, January 12th, 2012.
Pakistan’s real dangers are internal ─ William Milam January 6, 2012
Posted by Malik Siraj Akbar in Interviews.Tags: Haqqani Network, Malik Siraj Akbar, Memogate, Pakistan’s real dangers are internal, Quetta Shura, Taliban Qatar office, The future of Pakistan, US presidential elections 2012, US-Pakistan relations, William Milam, Woodrow Willson Center
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By Malik Siraj Akbar
The year 2010 witnessed a dramatic deterioration in trust and diplomatic relations between the United States and Pakistan. The two strategic partners in the war on terror traded allegations on the Raymond Davis affair, the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound, drone strikes, Admiral Mike Mullen’s assertion about ISI’s alleged contacts with the elements of Taliban who attacked the US embassy in Kabul, and the attack by Nato forces on Salala check post, which killed 24 Pakistani soldiers.
So, what is the future of the US-Pakistan relationship? Dawn.com spoke exclusively to William Bryant Milam, a former US ambassador to Pakistan (1998-2001) and Bangladesh (1990-1993). Milam is a currently a Senior Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC, where he completed a comprehensive study on modern Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Q: Some experts in Pakistan say the US does not seem to have a clear Pakistan policy. Others say Washington is ‘confused’ over whatever Pakistan policy it has at the moment. Do you agree?
A: The United States does have a Pakistan policy. In fact, it has had several Pakistan policies at different times. It has not been confused about Pakistan but it has had different situations to deal with Pakistan at different times. What we see today is the outcome of a long history of errors and misassumptions on both sides. In fact, it is a time when both countries will hopefully start reviewing the way they have been behaving and dealing with each other. At the moment, it is a pretty bad relationship.
Q: How would you evaluate Pak-US relationship in 2010? Were you expecting the developments that strained the relationship?
A: No. I think no one was expecting these events. I have contributed a chapter in the newly released book ‘The Future of Pakistan.’ I had written the first draft of my paper two years ago and subsequently revised it twice but even then things changed to such an extent in 2010 that when the book was published in 2011, much of the subject matter seemed out of date.
In early 2010, the US thought Pakistan could be an ally they could work with as a strategic partner, by helping develop it as a state instead of exclusively expecting it to cooperate in the war on terror. When the US passed the Kerry-Lugar Bill, it thought of Pakistan as a strategic partner. With the Raymond Davis affair, it became clear there was no free exchange of information between the two countries. The raid that killed Osama bin Laden highlighted the faulty exchange of information between both sides. It also became clearer that the two countries did not trust each other. Since then, the relationship has been limping along on distrust.
Q: How can a strategic relationship succeed when, with respect to drone strikes, Pakistanis feel that the US does not respect Pakistan’s sovereignty?
A: I presume Pakistan has been complicit in drone strikes. In fact, I think the government and military looked at the drone attacks on al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban in Pakistan’s interest for a long time. There has always been misunderstanding on the part among the public.
As far as the Osama raid is concerned, distrust between the United States and Pakistan had already reached such a point that the United States did not feel that it could inform Pakistan about an important target like bin Laden. They could not gamble on such a rich target being warned before conducting the raid and obviously did not inform the Pakistanis.
Q: So what was the reaction of retired diplomats and scholars when bin Laden was found and killed in Pakistan?
A: Well, everybody knew that he was hiding in Pakistan. His presence in Pakistan did not surprise us but the fact that he had taken shelter in Abbottabad was surprising. We all envisioned him hiding somewhere in a cave but he was found in a mansion in Abbottabad. I think the Pakistani government was not officially complicit in this but it leads to questions about their capabilities.
Q: How do the Americans look at the upsurge in anti-Americanism in Pakistan, their ally?
A: Pakistan has recently experienced the enormous growth of anti-Americanism in public opinion. It was always present but it was submerged much of the time. The real problem is that the Pakistani military officers and political leaders are all driven by this anti-American public opinion, which is fanned by the media. One example of how anti-Americanism can appeal to public opinion is the emergence of Imran Khan as a politician of consequence. The basis of his philosophy is anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism among politicians is understandable as they have to move with public opinion but the rise of similar feelings in the military has surprised a lot of Americans.
Q: Do you see an end of US engagement with Pakistan after 2014, when it withdraws troops from Afghanistan?
A: I think our engagement with Pakistan will continue beyond 2014, but it’s important to address the issue Pakistan’s impending failure as a state. One of the things currently bringing Pakistan down is its economy. The country’s economic situation is influencing the behaviour of its people.
Q: Will the (US) presidential elections influence America’s policy on Pakistan?
A: I don’t think so. Pakistan is going to remain geo-strategically important to the US even after the Afghanistan withdrawal. Pakistan remains vitally important to America’s interests in the South Asian region in terms of ensuring peace and curbing terrorism, be it from Pakistani soil or elsewhere, so that it does not spread across the region and the world.
The Bush administration dealt with Pakistan differently from the way the Obama administration did. It is clear that every administration will have its own way of working with Pakistan, but their interests will remain the same. If President Obama gets re-elected, you will see almost the same policy towards Pakistan. Nonetheless, the emphasis on Afghanistan, due to the withdrawal, may change. If the Republican presidential candidate gets elected, I do not foresee any policy change.
Q: It is ironic that the US castigates Pakistan for having contacts with different factions of Taliban but it also continues to have secret communication with some sections of the Taliban movement, such as the Haqqani Network. The US no longer discourages or rules out negotiating with Taliban.
A: For a long time, I didn’t know that the United States had contacts with the Haqqani Network. There are different types of Taliban within the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban. The Afghan Taliban are further divided between the Haqqani Network and the Quetta Shura while the Pakistani Taliban are also divided between the Taliban in tribal region and the Punjabi Taliban. You can’t lump them all together.
When President Obama was elected, we thought of trying to find a peaceful and political solution to the Afghan problem. This would allow us to draw down the number of US troops present in Afghanistan. From the initial days of President Obama, we were looking for ways to push for a political settlement. I think we should have made it a South Asian regional settlement from the very beginning. This could be something akin to the international agreement on the neutralization of Switzerland, in which all the neighbours would guarantee the neutralization of Afghanistan. Thus, none of these regional states would have a reason to push their own interests inside Afghanistan through their ethnic followers.
We started with the idea that we needed to reconcile with the reconcilable Taliban. At that point, it did not include the Haqqani Network. It only included some members of the Quetta Shura. You remember that we began to know about this when the ISI picked up Abdul Ghani Baradar, one of the reconcilable Taliban, who was supposedly talking to the Afghans and others.
As our relations worsened because of the Raymond Davis affair and the bin Laden raid, we thought it was necessary to get the Haqqani Network involved in negotiations. I don’t know how much we are talking to the Haqqani Network now. Whatever contacts remain there, they are mainly through the ISI. My guess is that our contacts with the Haqqanis are a very recent phenomenon.
Q: Is Afghanistan becoming a proxy battleground between Pakistan and India?
A: I sincerely hope not. In my article in the recently published book, The Future of Pakistan, I say we should try to build the kind of peace and political process in Afghanistan which will bring Indians and Pakistanis together so that they work with each other. Otherwise, the alternative may turn out to be that Afghanistan becomes a proxy battleground between the two. It is clear that one of the things that has been bothering Pakistan for a long time is the Indian presence in Afghanistan. I don’t think that is going to change much.
Q: It is paradoxical that many American diplomats and scholars complain about Pakistan’s India-centric approach although they know it emanates from the unresolved conflicts between India and Pakistan. Can the United States help in settling the problems between the two countries so that Pakistan gives up its burden of history?
A: The US can’t do anything in a tangible way as far as the dispute over Kashmir is concerned. We tried that years ago and failed miserably. We can help in formulating a peace process in Afghanistan that brings the two countries closer to each other to work together for a peaceful, stable and neutral Afghanistan which will benefit the interests of both countries. Another idea, which seems more likely, is to improve relations between the two countries by promoting bilateral trade.
We should stress our interests in both countries working to resolve their differences. Countries can have normal relations despite having differences. That is actually harder without a normal relationship. Pakistan and India need to normalize their relationship to resolve their differences, which can only happen over time. If they do not normalize relations by encouraging trade and allowing people-to-people contacts, they will never resolve their problems. I don’t believe there is anything the US can do in a specific way to help Pakistan accomplish its goals in Kashmir. Pakistanis have also started to understand this reality.
Q: How significant was the recent Bonn Conference without Pakistan attending it?
A: The Conference was a serious attempt to get things started on a regional basis. It was a serious problem that the Pakistanis boycotted the conference because of the killing of the Pakistani soldiers, which I think was basically an accident.
Q: Is the recent opening of a Taliban office in Qatar another attempt to distance Pakistan from the future solution of Afghanistan?
A: I don’t think it has anything to do with moving Pakistan out of the picture. Pakistan has legitimate interests in a viable, peaceful solution in Afghanistan. The Taliban had been looking for an office and it does not push them further apart from Pakistan than they are today. We have to know which Taliban we are talking about. If it is the TTP, they are already hostile against the state of Pakistan and they are determined to bring it down. If it is the Quetta Shura or the Haqqani Network, they are already friends with Pakistan.
Q: What are the immediate challenges Pakistan faces in near future?
A: Pakistan’s real and immediate dangers are internal, and, at the moment, primarily economic. The economy is about to collapse, which is a problem that cannot be solved overnight or without sacrifices on the part of the political leadership. The political leadership should develop policies that encourage growth and stop inflation. A second immediate danger is an armed insurgency from the Pakistani Taliban. Thirdly, related to the economic coming economic tsunami, the 18th Amendment has not been implemented well, which is likely to trigger inter-provincial disharmony, increasing risks that endanger the very survival of the federation.
If you look closely at these problems, the external threats, such as the Indian involvement in Afghanistan, pale by comparison. Pakistan’s internal problems are eating away at the vitals of the state. Pakistan may muddle through in the next five to ten years, but the present direction is sliding toward failure. There are some strong and positive institutions, such as the military and the judiciary, which will not let Pakistan fail. However, I hope the military does not take the economic situation as a pretext to grab political power.
Q: Today the future of democracy in Pakistan is once again in danger because of visible rift between the civilian government and the strong military in the wake of the Memogate which somewhat indirectly involves the United States. What are your thoughts on Memogate?
A: I am totally befuddled. When I saw the text of the memo, I wondered how anybody could think it was genuine. It seemed a ridiculously phony document. I am confused why intelligent people are trusting the memo is real, and why intelligent people who are accused of having written it would have done so. The memo has clearly worsened relations between Pakistan’s senior military and civilian leadership. We don’t know what is going to happen as a result of that.
There are now rumours of ousting Prime Minister Gilani and replacing him with somebody else. This all looks weird to us outsiders. Pakistan is falling apart economically and here the leaders are caught debating a very questionable memo and making it into a cause celebre, when there are riots over electricity and gas shortages, raging inflation, and rapidly increasing poverty.
The memo struck me from the beginning that somebody was being set up. I find it a weird preoccupation at a time when the country is sinking fast economically. I hope the investigation conducted will be fair, objective, transparent – and quick so the leaders can get back to Pakistan’s real existential problems. (Courtesy: Dawn.com)
Remembering Qambar Chakar, who loved information technology and was killed in its quest January 5, 2012
Posted by Malik Siraj Akbar in Malik Siraj Akbar.Tags: Balochistan University, Pakistani intelligence agencies
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Baloch parents must educate their children about two important facts as we mark the first “killed and dumped” anniversary of one of the most charismatic student leaders of our times: Who Qambar Chakar was and why he was killed. Although hundreds of brilliant young Balochs have been engulfed by the government’s ‘kill and dump operations’ in Balochistan, Qambar Chakar merits special tributes for his remarkable role in Baloch reawakening. Many say he was killed by the Pakistani intelligence agencies too young while we think they killed him too late as he had already left a visionary legacy.
For those unfamiliar with the twenty-four year old Baloch activist, let’s summarize his political and educational struggle in these words. Chakar, a member of a middle class Baloch family in Kech district, was a Master’s student at the Department of Economics at the Balochistan University of Information Technology and Management Sciences (BUITMS). He was profoundly perturbed over the colonization of Balochistan’s primer educational institutions, particularly at the BUITMS where a discriminatory admission policy closed doors of education for native Balochs at the cost of outsiders under the pretext of ‘open-merit’. Chakar, who had himself successfully sought admission at the University on merit, revolted against the admission policy and called for reforms so that more Baloch students from remote and under-privileged areas could also be admitted there.
With two other student colleagues i.e. Qambar Malik Baloch and Khurshid Baloch, late Qambar Chakar sat on an unto death hunger strike camp in front of the Quetta Press Club in support of his demands. He argued ‘merit’ was a ploy to shut down the doors of higher education for Baloch students. If open merit was the only criterion to admit students at the BUITMS then the beneficiaries would exclusively be the urban rich kids who had attended grammarian schools and colleges. Hence, Baloch children from far-off districts would be outnumbered by the children of non-Baloch and non-Balochistani bureaucrats and army officers who came up with a more sophisticated educational background because of their social and economic strata. Mr. Chakar’s campaign was not opposed to the ‘merit’ per se. What he stood for was actually merit but at district level so that each of Balochistan’s thirty district could get representation at this important educational institution.
The government of Pakistan loathed Baloch student’s this uprising and used various tactics to countervail their movement. One way was to pit Pashtun student organizations against the Baloch by enticing them to issue statements in the newspapers on daily basis in support of the controversial admission policy. The entry policy then served the Pashtun interests because all Pashtun districts, such as Pishin, Lorali, Ziarat and Qila Abdullah are so close to Quetta that children from those districts could easily come to attend school in the morning and return home in the evening.
On the other hand, it took someone like Qambar Chakar three days’ hard journey on broken roads to reach from his native Kech district to Quetta, the capital of Balochistan. These harsh ground realities which enormously contributed to the Baloch backwardness primarily caused Qambar’s anguish. Secondly, the government also repeatedly endeavored to push the Baloch students in a state of inferiority complex by telling them they were not compatible with contemporary educational challenges and were shying away from facing the so-called open merit-based policy. The government, on the other hand, totally failed to ever explain why it had failed to provide the same level of education and facilities in schools in remote parts of Balochistan which were available in Quetta.
Qambar Chakar elegantly read a colonizer’s mindset and did not lose his confidence in the wake of the official propaganda unleashed in the local media. He stood for what he truly believed in for the greater interest of Balochistan’s future. As a part of his revolutionary campaign which was joined by hundreds of Baloch students, Qambar surrounded the Governor’s House until Governor Zulfiqar Ali Magsi was forced to come out to negotiate with the Baloch activist leader. The Governor offered him negotiations ‘inside the Governor’s House’, which Qambar utterly rejected saying that he would not hold secret negotiations with a government official.
“If you have to make a decision,” he told implicitly told Governor Magsi, “you have to make it in front of all the student.”
Understandably, the governor, who is also the chancellor of the BUITMS, did not concede to Qambar’s demands, nor did the latter surrender.
When the government failed to break the resolve of the young Baloch student through threats and ostentatious offers, they brazenly kidnapped Qambar on July 10, 2010 from the same educational institution where he was a student reportedly with the support of the institution’s Pashtun vice chancellor. The young activist was tortured, humiliated and implicated in a false case of possessing a hand grande. Charges against him were never substantiated in a court. He was detained so that he would bunk all his important exams and meet his academic demise. Security forces illegally detained Chakar for at least nine months. By then, he had emerged as a mature and popular student leader who once again stood for the educational rights of the Baloch people.
Extrajudicial confinement did not deter Qambar from his commitment to his people and their basic human rights. He immediately returned to the political battleground which eventually turned out to be a fatal gamble for him. Incensed over his steadfastness and defiance, the security establishment eventually decided to permanently get rid of Qambar. Thus, officials kidnapped him for the second time on November 26, 2010. He never returned. When the young firebrand was found on January 5th, 2011 on Pasni Road in Turbat, he had been tortured to martyrdom.
Like hundreds of other ‘killed and dumped’ Balochs, Qambar Chakar’s family still awaits justice. No investigation was ever conducted in his murder because those who were blamed for kidnapping and murdering him were all disappointingly the very ‘custodians of the law’.
Qambar Chakar was different from so many of his compatriots. He was frail but still a bold strategist and cogent orator. He very impressively communicated and coordinated with the media. He was too clear in what he stood for as he was simply not a blind-follower. He thought in issues-based rather than personality-based politics. As a senior leader of the Baloch Students Organization (BSO-Azad) Qambar was a very promising young campaigner. When he lived, we predicted he’d one day become Balochistan’s most charismatic leader rising from the middle class. Now that is no more with us, we believe he has the most inspiring and motivational story of a young man who loved modern education and fought for his people’s rights, until his death. Only those who truly know the value of modern education for their people would go to the extent of sacrificing their lives. Qambar was indeed our martyr of the technological era. He lived and fought for Baloch rights in a 21st-centuary style.
Qambar Chakar will be truly missed by all of us who dream of a progressive, enlightened and empowered Balochistan. Rest in peace, young comrade! (Courtesy: The Baloch Hal)
