Beurag Baloch

Meet three-year old Beurag Baloch. He is the son of Jalil Reki, the central secretary information of the Baloch Republican Party (BRP), who went missing since the early days of 2009. Beurag tells us that he believes his father was picked up by the agencies. He does not exactly know what “agencies” mean and what their job is. Yet, he says he misses his “missing father” very much.

His dad is among thousands of Balochs who are currently “missing” after being whisked away by the country’s intelligence agencies. They say some 4000 Balochs have “disappeared” at the moment.

Beurag held my hand and asked me to take his picture pretending to be behind bars in order to convey his willingness to go behind bars in return of his missing father’s release.

“Uncle, can you do me this favor,” he asked this afternoon.

I could not promise but assured to convey his message with his own photograph to everyone that this young child is volunteering to go to Pakistan’s torture cells in return of his father’s release from the custody of the intelligence agencies.

This is a beautiful Balochi song written by Waja Ghulam Mohammad Shaeed and sung by Arif Baloch. Ghulam Mohammad was arrested and subsequently killed allegedly by the Pakistani state intelligence agencies along with two of his politcal friends, Lala Munir Ahmed Baloch Shaeed and Sher Mohammad Baloch Shaeed.

TEHRAN — (AFP): The deputy head of Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards charged on Friday that Pakistan arrested and then released the leader of Jundallah a few days before a suicide bombing claimed by the Sunni rebel group.

“We have precise information about the movement and places where terrorists are hiding,” the Fars news agency quoted Brigadier General Hossein Salami as saying.

“On September 26, Abdolmalek Rigi was arrested in one of the streets of Quetta but after one hour he was released following the intervention of the intelligence service of our neighbouring country,” Salami said.

Quetta is the capital of Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, which borders Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province where Jundallah is active. Ethnic Baluchis, the community the rebel group says it is fighting for, straddle the border.

Some 42 people, including 15 Revolutionary Guards members, died in the October 18 bombing in the Sistan-Baluchestan town of Pisheen.

“How is it possible that this guy can move freely (unless he is) under the protection of the intelligence services?” the Guards number two said, according to Fars.

Iran has said those responsible for the bombing were based in Pakistan and has demanded that Islamabad hand Rigi over.

Islamabad has strongly denied that Jundallah (Soldiers of God) launched the attack from its territory.

On Thursday, Pakistani police said three Iranians arrested for illegally entering Pakistan may have been linked to the Pisheen bombing.

Hamida Ghafour

By Hamida Ghafour in THE NATIONAL on October 23, 2009

When the British army advanced through Baluchistan in 1839, one of its officers wrote that the Baluch were so treacherous that the troublesome fiefdom required an “exaction of retribution” and the “execution of such arrangements as would establish future security in that area”.

Mehrab Khan, the Khan of Kalat, was executed, 400 of his tribesmen were slain and the British began their gradual occupation of the area.

More than 170 years on, the Baluch territory – 220,000 square miles of mountains and arid lands that are now divided between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan – are just as troubled as they were during the Great Game.

Clandestine operations, murky deaths and shifting tribal loyalties are replete with modern adjustments such as suicide bombings, natural gas, and the presence of Americans who have replaced the British as the superpower.

The long-simmering conflict had been largely forgotten until last Sunday when it burst on to the international stage following a suicide attack targeting the Revolutionary Guards in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan province. Forty-two people were killed, many of them high-ranking members of the elite corps. A second roadside attack hit a Revolutionary Guards’ vehicle. Several arrests have been made.

Controlling their Baluch minority populations with their nationalist aspirations has not been any easier for the Iranian or Pakistani governments than it was for the British colonialists.

Sunday’s attack took place during a meeting in the town of Pishin between Sunni, Shiite tribal chiefs and the Revolutionary Guards leadership, who were put in charge of the province’s security in April because of escalating violence.

They have held a number of similar conferences in the past with the view to contain a conflict that is becoming increasingly sectarian, and halt drugs and guns smuggling in the poverty-stricken province.

Sistan-Baluchistan is home to 1.4 million Baluchi who speak their own language and are ethnically different from the majority Persians. The territory became part of Iran in 1928.

“These conferences are networking events and bring people together who might otherwise never meet, either because of animosity, rivalry or simple lack of proximity,” said Mahan Abedin, the director of research at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism at the University of St Andrews, Scotland. Noor Ali Shooshtari, the most senior commander killed in the attack, had made his personal mark on the programme and was trying to expand it.

A shadowy group named Jondallah, or soldiers of God, founded in 2002 or 2003 in Iran, has claimed responsibility and published a statement that said it was avenging “the wounds of the Baluch people which have been bleeding for years without end”.

The supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have accused Britain, America and Pakistan of having a hand in the attacks and have said the leader of Jondallah had direct contact with British and American intelligence services.

Washington, London and Islamabad have denied the accusations. A delegation of Iranians is expected to visit Pakistan shortly to present evidence.

While unsubstantiated accusations and denials are flying around, what is clear is the violence is escalating in Pakistan and Iran.

Sunday’s attack was the deadliest on Iranian soil in many years. In May, a Shiite mosque was bombed, killing 25. Last year Jondallah kidnapped and killed 16 Iranian soldiers and in 2007 it claimed responsibility for bombing a bus.

“The nationalist cause is pushed towards extremism by the brute force of Iranian military and security forces who do not tolerate even the slightest vestiges of any dissent or civil activities by the Sunni Baluch people,” says Abdol Sattar Doshoki, a Baluch activist and analyst, speaking from London.

In both Pakistan and Iran the Baluchi are an oppressed minority, says Ahmed Suleman Daud, the 35th Khan of Kalat and direct descendant of Mehrab Khan, who was executed by the British.

“As far as the state is concerned they are almost fourth-grade citizens,” says the khan. “Suppression is continuing, thousands of people are missing, doctors, engineers, people like that, and even women are missing, kept as sex slaves by the army, and these things don’t go very well as far as the Baluch are concerned. It is the same in Iran.”

Baluchi nationalists in Pakistan, which annexed their previously independent territory in 1948, want a separate state and the movement is secular. In Iran, however, Baluchi nationalism has become mixed with religious extremism.

Jondallah has stated in the past that it does not want a breakaway state but wants Iran to respect human rights and the culture of the Baluchi.

Human rights groups have documented a litany of arrests, killings, torture and repression in both countries. “We can’t speak our Baluchi language, it is not taught in any of the schools and we are the richest mineral-rich area of the region but we are the most poor,” says the Khan of Kalat.

Pakistan’s Baluchistan province is home to between four and eight million Baluch who are in the throes of an insurgency that has been raging since 2000 when the government began exploring in depth its vast oil and natural gasfields. The Baluchi were excluded from the provincial government.

The khan, a major symbol of Baluch nationalism, lives in a three-bedroom house in Cardiff,

Wales, and is seeking asylum in Britain because he fears assassination in Pakistan. He chose Wales because it reminds him of the mountains back home.

“When I remember my country I take a stroll in the mountains,” he says.

He fled Pakistan in 2006 after convening a tribal jirga, or gathering, in which 1,500 Baluch activists, tribal leaders and politicians agreed to take their cause to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The khan spent months travelling across the Gulf states, including the UAE which is home to many Baluchi migrant workers, to try to galvanise support.

High-ranking tribal chiefs are being targeted by the Pakistani security services. Among the most prominent was the Oxford-educated Nawab of Bugti, who escaped to the mountains near Kohlu with several thousand armed tribesmen but was killed in a military operation in 2006.

He had been demanding greater autonomy and a higher share of revenues for his people from Baluchistan’s natural gas.

“We are not aggressors; we are just defending ourselves and we are fighting in our land,” says the khan.

The stakes are high.

Pakistan is already fighting militants in Waziristan and needs the gasfields to develop its economy.

There is concern that Iran’s relations with Pakistan will take a turn for the worse and endanger plans for a gas pipeline running between the two countries through Baluch territory, which would see Iran supply 750 million cu ft of gas a day to Pakistan over the next 25 years.

In Iran, the only Shiite-majority country in the world, the authorities are worried about a possible Sunni insurgency.

Meanwhile, America’s role in Sunday’s attack is not clear.

In 2008, the respected American journalist Seymour Hersh reported in The New Yorker magazine that under the Bush administration Congress had authorised up to US$400 million in covert operations, including assisting Jondallah in a bid to destabilise the Iranian government.

Col Sam Gardiner, a retired air force commander who has taught military strategy at the National War College in Washington, believes the allegations are true.

He pointed out that Jondallah was not on the state department’s list of designated terrorist groups.

“It is almost prima face evidence of US involvement. It was clear early in the Obama administration that they had decided to cut ties with the groups that had been working inside Iran with one exception — Jondallah,” he said, speaking from Washington.

“If it was a terrorist group even the intelligence community ends up being restricted. The American government and personnel are prohibited from dealing with terrorist groups.”

With little international attention the Baluchi have no choice but to defend themselves, says Faiz Baluch, an Iranian Baluchi who was acquitted of terrorism charges in England this year and has spoken in the House of Lords about the issue.

“The international community has ignored the issue. The Baluch are actually left with no other option but to stand up to these regimes and defend themselves against the atrocities that these states are committing.”

Write to Hamida Ghafour: hghafour@thenational.ae

Dear friends,

Balochistan is burning and needs our special and urgent attention. For the fifth time the people of Balochistan have been forced to take up arms as an expression of defiance against their continued exploitation. Each time the state of Pakistan embarked on military action to crush the resistance rather than to seek a reconciliation with the Baloch.

The state atrocities on the people of Balochistan have now reached unbearable proportions. So many have faced extrajudicial killings. Thousands of young men have disappeared at the hand of state agencies. Common people are being humiliated everyday by the Pakistani law enforcement agencies. Most young men in Balochistan have become totally alienated from Pakistan. If we continue to keep quiet we will commit a gross injustice to our Balochistani brothers and sisters. We must speak up now.

We the citizens of Pakistan must express solidarity with the people of Balochistan. The enclosed statement is meant to do just that. It also suggests steps that we the citizens feel the government must take in this regard.

We are approaching you to seek your help in this campaign.

A web-based signature portal is also being created. But we are all aware that as a vast majority of Pakistani citizens do not have access to such portals. Hence a need for signatures on a printed statement. The statement is in both English and Urdu, and we would deeply appreciate if some friends translate and print it in other languages, and get signatures.

Please join the campaign by collecting the maximum possible number of signatures on the statement, beginning with the members of your organization but also reaching out to as many others as possible. After obtaining these signatures, please mail the signed copies of the statement to the address printed at the bottom of the statement.

Please read below some facts about Balochistan that highlight the reasons underlying the intense resentment among the common people of Balochistan.

Economic Deprivation of Baloch People

· 18 out of the 20 most infrastructure-deprived districts in Pakistan are in Balochistan.
· The percentage of districts that are classified as high deprivation stands as follows: 29 per cent in Punjab, 50 per cent in Sindh, 62 per cent in the NWFP, and 92 per cent in Balochistan. If Quetta and Ziarat are excluded, all of Balochistan falls into the high deprivation category. And Quetta’s ranking would fall if the cantonment is excluded from the analysis.
· The percentage of population living in a high degree of deprivation stands at 25 per cent in Punjab, 23 per cent in urban Sindh, 49 per cent in rural Sindh, 51 per cent in the NWFP, and 88 per cent in Balochistan”.
· Province’s 48 percent of the total population lives below poverty line whereas 26 percent in Punjab, NWFP 29 percent, and 38 percent urban and 27 percent rural population in Sindh.
· The national literacy rate in Pakistan is 50 percent, the province has 23 percent literacy rate with only 7 percent female literacy rate.
· Only 4 out of total 30 districts have gas supply while the province has been a major producer of gas for the total domestic, commercial and industrial needs of the country from early 50s. The capital of the province, Quetta, was provided gas in 1986.
· 78 percent population has no electricity.
· 79 percent has no gas facility while the province has a very low gas consumption of the country especially as compared to 64 percent of Punjab.

Mega development projects

The local population remains largely deprived of the benefits of mega development projects such as Gwadar port, Mirani dam, Kachhi canal, coastal highway, cantonments, and Pasni oil refinery plant etc.
Mostly outsiders benefit from such development schemes. The province has witnessed an influx of more than 5 million people to Gwadar port and other development areas.

Non-Baloch technicians and workers are hired while Balochs are only hired as unskilled workers.

Out of 1200 employees at Saindak copper-gold project, only 50 belong to Balochistan. Similarly, 130 engineers from Balochistan were trained at Karachi to be employed at Gwadar Port but they were denied jobs.
Land developers and investors from outside Balochistan are allowed purchase of Balochistan land.

1. Conflict-generating history

The current military operation in Balochistan is the fifth in the series. The first one was in 1948, the second in 1958, the third in 1962, the fourth in 1973. All the operations were to curb resistance to interference from the Central Government.

Historically, Balochistan or Kalat has never been a part of Indian state.
After the British conquered a part of the State of Kalat in 1839, the British pledged to respect the independence of Kalat and also gave it subsidies to maintain local loyalty for protecting British interests.
Mir Ahmed Yar Khan and the people of Balochistan supported the movement for the creation of Pakistan but at the same time they envisioned Kalat as a separate, independent and sovereign state after the departure of British from India.

Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah himself was the champion of independence and sovereignty of Kalat. In 1946, Mr. Jinnah pleaded before the Cabinet Mission for complete independence and sovereignty for Kalat as it existed before the agreements and treaties of 1841, 1854 and 1876 with the British. The Marri and Bugti Tumandars also joined the plea demanding their regions to be included with the Kalat federation. Quaid-i-Azam won the case.

Thus Kalat and Pakistan signed a standstill agreement on 4th August 1947 in which Pakistan recognized Kalat as an independent sovereign state, while future relations between Kalat and Pakistan regarding defense, external affairs and communications were to be negotiated later.

While Pakistan announced its independence on 14 of August 1947, Kalat announced its independence on the very next day, 15 August 1947.

But soon after independence, Kalat was pressurized to merge itself with Pakistan in the ‘interests of both’.

The Khan of Kalat refused to agree and tabled this desire of Pakistan in the Kalat State Houses of Parliament, Dar-ul-Umra and Dar-ul-Awam, which unanimously refused to merge Kalat with Pakistan. However they partially agreed to have an agreement with Pakistan for having a joint currency, defense and external affairs while keeping Kalat an independent and sovereign state.

The members, however, pledged to strongly resist any coercive action from Pakistan even with force.

Pakistan illegally annexed Kalat’s sub-states Makran, Kharan and Lasbella.

Pakistan ordered its garrison commander to invade Kalat and keep the Khan under house arrest until he signs the document of annexation.
Khan eventually went to Karachi and signed a controversial but conditional merger document with Pakistan on 27th March 1948 in his personal capacity despite strong opposition of both Kalat legislators.
This forced annexation gave birth to this conflict erupting in a low-scale resistance in Kalat led by the younger brother of Khan, Agha Abdul Karim, who was governor of Makran that had been part of Kalat for 300 years. However, the rebellion was overcome by military as the resistant leaders were arrested over a deceptive agreement on Holy Quran but were imprisoned as well as fined. Agha Karim spent seven years in prison.

In a personal meeting in 1958, President Iskandar Mirza asked the Khan of Kalat to mobilize sardars for the restoration of the Khanate of Kalat., and then on the pretext of this activity, sent in Pakistan Army under the command of Tikka Khan. The army arrested the Khan and sent him to an internment in Lahore. As soon as Ayub Khan took charge, he sentenced Prince Karim to another 14 years of jail term. In May 1959, Nawab Nauroz Khan Zehri came down from mountains on assurance of amnesty on Quran. He was immediately arrested together with his sons and grandsons and sent to Hyderabad jail, where they were tried for treason. Seven of his associates, including his sons were sentenced to death and hanged in Hyderabad. The ninety years old Nawab Zehri died in captivity in Hyderabad.

In 1962, Ayub Khan sacked Ataullah Mengal, Nawab Khair Bukhsh Marri, and Nawab Akbar Bugti from their hereditary positions as sardars of their tribes. This led to resistance, which was again quelled with an army action, arrests, long incarcerations, etc.

From this resistance emerged a movement (1962 to 1968) which resisted the one unit regime imposed by Ayub Khan in West Pakistan to provide population parity between the two wings of the country. One unit was finally disbanded in 1969 and Balochistan gained the status of a province in 1970.

Another resistance started in 1973 when the federal government of Z. A. Bhutto sacked the elected government of Balochistan on the flimsy charge of conspiracy against the state. The Army again went in to crush the resistance, but this time with the help of the Shah of Iran, and using most sophisticated equipment including helicopter gunships. It was the bloodiest conflict. The resistance ended when General Zia ul Haq’s military dictatorship announced a general amnesty in 1978.
The current resistance and military action started during the military dictatorship of General Musharraf in response to the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti.

Need your help in getting signatures on Balochistan statement

Statement on Balochistan

A situation akin to 1971 is brewing in Balochistan. Radical nationalists advocating a separate state of Balochistan are steadily gaining popularity at the expense of those who continue to look for a solution within the federal framework.
The reasons for this surge in separatism are quite apparent. The people of Balochistan have a long list of grievances, and next to none have been addressed over the last 60 years. Instead of negotiations and redressing the wrongs, successive Pakistani governments have resorted to brute force in the form of five military operations starting as early as 1948.
The 1973 constitution provided for complete provincial autonomy within ten years. To date, this remains a meaningless promise on paper.
In fact, Balochistan continues to be ruled as a colony, its resources benefiting the federal government and dominant provinces. Grueling poverty and deprivation defines much of the province. 88% of the population of Balochistan is under the poverty line. Balochistan has the lowest literacy rate, the lowest school enrollment ratio, the lowest educational attainment index, and the lowest health index relative to the other provinces. 78% of the population has no access to electricity, and 79% has no access to natural gas. The federal government’s presence is made apparent not through public welfare activities, but through violence and aggression. A large number of military and paramilitary troops (upwards of 37,000) have been stationed in different parts of the province and state-perpetrated violence has become a common feature of the political landscape of Balochistan. Disappearance of political activists and extrajudicial killings has become all too common. It is stating the obvious that such a situation has given rise to alienation, extreme resentment, and a feeling of enslavement to the Pakistani state.
As the injustices, crimes, rapes and genocide of 1971 unfolded before our eyes, too many Pakistanis were silent. Today, as Balochistan treads down the same path, we are again silent. We are, as were then, beneficiaries of the economic exploitation. Sui gas is available in our homes but there is none in most of Balochistan. Revenues collected from goods and services originating in Balochistan are spent elsewhere.
As conscious citizens who recognize the injustice, and indeed the danger, in this, we demand that the following steps be taken by the federal government so as to end the oppression of the people of Balochistan.

1. An immediate and complete cessation of military and paramilitary actions in all parts of Balochistan, withdrawal of the military and paramilitary forces to their barracks, and reduction of military and paramilitary forces to the level of the year 2000. No more cantonments should be built in Balochistan.
2. An immediate end to the torture, harassment, abduction and murders of the activists of Balochistan. All activists must be released unconditionally, and total amnesty should be declared for those who took up arms to defend their right and honour. Over 1300 people of Balochistan have been ‘disappeared’ – they must be produced in court as per the directives of the Supreme Court, and judicial inquiry made into their ‘disappearances’, their conditions during the period of ‘disappearance’, and the legality or illegality of these acts.
3. The provisions of 1973 constitution pertaining to provincial autonomy should be enacted immediately, giving Balochistan and all other provinces control over all but four areas of governance (defense, communications, currency, and foreign affairs). The Concurrent Lists should be abolished.
4. The people of Balochistan should be the first beneficiaries of their resources. Oil and gas originating in the province should first benefit the people of the province and then the rest of the country. A formula for sharing resources should be worked out to the satisfaction of all provinces.
5. Comprehensive public infrastructure including schools, colleges, hospitals, water supply systems, roads, etc, must be built. Special attention must be given to creating a skilled labour force among the people of Balochistan that is capable of assuming professional responsibilities at every level.
6. Land owned or acquired by the armed forces for ‘strategic’ purposes should be handed back to the provincial government. Construction of all new cantonments should cease immediately. Likewise, all large ‘development’ projects, including Gwadar, should be put on hold until the conflict is resolved and reservations of the people of Balochistan have been addressed.
7. The 80,000 or so people reportedly displaced by successive military operations should be rehabilitated immediately.
8. Political manipulation at all levels by the federal government and intelligence agencies, including pitching tribes and political groups against each other, should cease immediately.
9. Priority should be given to the people of Balochistan in staffing all institutions, particularly government, in Balochistan. The federal quota for the people of Balochistan should also be increased.
10. The people of Balochistan should be compensated for the economic exploitation that they have been subject to for the past 60 years.
The situation in Balochistan is grave and demands for independence are growing stronger. The above steps are the minimum that must necessarily be taken if justice is to be done. If they are not taken, then self determination will be the logical and justified demand of the people of Balochistan. It is high time that Pakistan woke up.

We sign this to express our agreement with the above statement and demands.

Signature Name Address + Phone (optional)

Please post the signed statement to P. O. Box 3395, GPO Islamabad

Destabilizing Baluchistan, Fracturing Pakistan
The Triangle of Jundallah, the Taliban, and Sipah-e-Sahaba

By Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya

“Managed Chaos” is the proper term to describe the tensions in NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan and the border zones of Pakistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are now being described by the Pentagon and NATO as the same front in the very same war, are tied to the Iranian border province of Sistan and Baluchistan or Sistan-Baluchistan. It is with the tenure of George W. Bush Jr. and his administration that Sistan-Baluchistan, with emphases on “Baluchistan” begun getting international attention through the ignition of a series of attacks inside the Iranian border with Pakistan by a group originally calling itself the “Army of God” or Jundallah in Arabic.

One must first take a closer look at Sistan-Baluchistan and the issues being depicted as the source of antagonism there before discussing Jundallah, the nature of its attacks, its source of support, and if the Pakistani government and the Obama Administration have been involved with Jundallah’s attacks. So, with a purposeful focus on Baluchistan, what is Sistan-Baluchistan and where is it? The Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan, which is located in southeastern Iran, is in fact the blending of two different bodies, one is Sistan and the other is Baluchistan. Both were separate historical entities and Iranian provinces until they were amalgamated into one in 1959 under the reign of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the last shah or monarch of Iran.

Sistan according to some local traditions is the legendary home of the Iranian epic hero Rustam. Sistan is also where Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who is an Iranian, originates from. In ethnic terms the people of Sistan are mostly Persians and Sistani. Sistani is a label that can be used to identify anyone from Sistan, but it also has two other meanings. Sistani in ethnographic terms is used to refer to a sub-population of the Baluch or Baluchi, which are a distinct Iranic ethno-linguistic group. The relationship between the Sistani and the Baluchi almost correlates with the affinities between the Flemish and the Dutch or of those between the Pathans (Pashto of Pakistan) and the Pashto in Afghanistan. What sets the Sistani apart and is a cause for their distinction is geography and, more importantly, the fact that they speak a localized dialect of the Persian language called Sistani.

Moving on, Baluchistan is the other part of the Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan. Baluchistan, however, is not limited to Iran and is also a larger region that encompasses southern Afghanistan and a large slice of Pakistani territory. Sistan can also be included or excluded from this broader region of Baluchistan. The coastal region of Makran, which runs through both Iran and Pakistan, is also a sub-region of Baluchistan. Makran is of great geo-strategic importance and is home to the Pakistani port of Gwadar that both the U.S. and China are deeply interested in as an energy terminal and a naval base.

The province of Baluchistan in Pakistan is where the overwhelming majority of the Baluchi live. Pakistani Baluchistan was once mostly populated by Baluch and other relatively indigenous people before British control and later waves of immigration that caused demographic changes. Starting in 1947 the mass immigration of new ethnic groups leaving India for Pakistan because they were Muslims and the conflict in Afghanistan, starting with the 1979 Soviet invasion, also changed Pakistani Baluchistan’s ethnic composition. The Baluchi themselves, however, did not always live in Baluchistan. The Baluchi moved eastward to most of present-day Baluchistan from the Iranian province of Kerman or Kermania (Germania) during the period of Seljuk rule in Iran. The ancestors of the Baluchi also themselves had migrated to Kerman in earlier times.

Is Jundallah fighting for Baluch and Sunni Muslim rights against Persians and Shiite Muslims?

The genesis being presented about the Jundallah attacks in Baluchistan is offered as one that is dual-natured. Firstly the Jundallah attacks are being portrayed as being sparked on the basis of sectarianism and secondly on the basis of ethnicity. In this sense the intermittent attacks and explosions in Baluchistan are presented in the framework of a conflict between a confessional minority versus a confessional majority in Iran and to a lesser extent as an ethnic minority versus an ethnic majority.

One is almost tempted to state that the conflict between Tehran and Jundallah has been portrayed by Jundallah as one between Persians and Baluchi, which to some extent was originally how it was portrayed. In many places the media has framed it as such, along with the sectarian dimension of Sunnis versus Shiites. This is grossly inaccurate. Jundallah’s later attacks were portrayed differently by the group itself, but it should be noted that the statements of Jundallah on its fight have changed too. Jundallah’s attacks became mostly framed as being predominantly against the Iranian central government. The group even changed its name to the “People’s Resistance Movement of Iran” to make it appear as an internal Iranian struggle against the government in Tehran.

As an important side note: albeit Persian is the official language of Iran, Persians are merely a plurality in Iran and it is fundamentally wrong to describe the Iranian attribute as Persian. Iran is not a Persian country as so many authors, journalists, and sadly scholars wrongly state; Iran is an Iranian country and the Persian identity, like Azerbaijani (Azeri/Azari) or Baluchi, is a subsidiary to this Iranian identity as an Iranologist would be able to explain. All Persians are Iranian, but all Iranians are not Persians.

Who are the Baluch?

Simply asked, what are the Baluch? Are they Iranian or not? Do the Baluchi as a whole have aspirations to create “Free Baluchistan” or their own state? Do the Baluchi want independence from Iran as is being reported in the U.S., France, Britain, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and several other countries? Once this is answered then Jundallah can be addressed.

Nomenclature is important in regards to understanding not only Baluchistan, but all Eurasia from Lagos to Vladivostok. In categorizing the ethno-linguistic cluster of peoples in the Iranian Plateau, which extends from Iran to Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan, one must grasp the understanding that the term Iranian is charged with multiple meanings. Iranian is a national, a linguistic, and an ethnic tag. These matrices can become very confusing when looking at questions concerning this area from an outside view, but yet are essential to understanding the nature of the subject.

Already as it is, ethnicity is a highly confusing topic with both subjective and objective elements. Imagine the confusion that would arise if the term “German” was being used, as it once frequently was, not only to identify German nationality and to designate German ethnicity (which is used to describe a whole people ranging from Germany to Austria and Switzerland), but to identify members of the Germanic branch of the Indo-European language family. Germanic includes English, Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, and Dutch, amongst other languages. Great confusion would arise from calling these other peoples German on top of their other labels. In regards to Iranian, this is the case. This is also compounded by the careless substitution of Iranian as a designation for Persian or vice-versa, which is similar to the misuse of the terms English and British.

To prevent confusion the term Iranic will be used in preference to the term Iranian in regards to ethno-linguistic designation(s) to help identify the additional attributes of either ethnicity, language, or both. Without turning this discourse into a treatise on language, one may also ask are ethnicity and language linked? Yes and no. Speaking English does not necessarily make one an Anglo-Saxon, just as speaking Spanish or Russian does not make one a member of those ethnic groups either. Ethnicity, however, historically does have a direct correlation with the origins of languages.

Moving forward, the Baluch originate from the area around the Caspian Sea in the Caucasus. Speaking strictly in ethnic terms, the Baluch are an Iranian or Iranic people. They are Iranian or Iranic, regardless of if they live in Iranian Baluchistan or Pakistani Baluchistan or in Afghanistan. Despite their more commonly darker phenotype (appearance) the Baluchi are of the same stock(s) as the Persians and Kurds. They also speak their own language, Baluchi. Baluchi is a Northwestern Iranic language, which is a sub-division of a broader linguistic grouping called Western Iranic. Northwestern Iranic includes Kurdish, the language of the Kurds, and Talysh, a language mostly spoken in the Iranian province of Gilan and in the Republic of Azerbaijan. In turn Western Iranic is part of the larger Iranic branch (or sub-branch, if you consider it one with Indo-Aryan or Indic) of the Indo-European language family, which includes the Slavic, Germanic, Romance, Celtic, Albanian, and Greek languages.

Persian, the official language of Iran, and Tajik are examples of Southwestern Iranic languages, which also belong to the larger Western Iranic group like both Baluchi and Kurdish. In regards to the Western Iranic languages they evolved from the three main Iranian groups of antiquity that moved into the Iranian Plateau from Europe and/or Central Asia. The Northwestern Iranic group developed from the dialects of the Parthians (who lived in Parthia, which excluding Hyrcania was roughly corresponding to the province of Khorasan) and the Medes (who lived in Media, which roughly covered northwestern Iran and parts of Iraqi Kurdistan), while the Southwestern Iranic group developed from the dialect of the ancient Persians (who lived in Persia/Persis or roughly the modern-day province of Pars/Fars in southwestern Iran). Pashto and Ossetian are respective modern examples of the Eastern Iranic group that also included Scythian, which was once spoken from the Ukraine and Russia to what is now Chinese Turkistan.

Like all other people, the Baluchi are also a mixture of new waves and different stocks of people, including the original Dravidian people who thousands of years ago lived in the Iranian Plateau before they were pushed southward or assimilated by the ancient Iranians as they migrated into Anatolia and the Iranian Plateau during a major period of Indo-European migration. The Brahui in Pakistan, which are closely tied to the Baluchi and very often mistaken for Baluchi, are a surviving remnant of this older Dravidian stock. Arabs and other Semitic peoples, as well as various groups from the littoral of the Indian Ocean, have also mixed with the Baluchi gene pool over time, especially in Makran.

Most the Baluch are also Muslims of the Sunni confession. The confessional difference between the Baluchi and the majority of Iranians has not always existed. It began under the Safavid Dynasty of Iran. During the Safavid period, when most other Iranians became Shiite Muslims, the Baluchi like many of the Kurds maintained their Sunnism. Some of the reasons for this had to do with clan autonomy from the central government and with the fact that these groups were on the frontiers of the Safavid Empire where defensive cooperation with their chieftains was important for the Safavid monarchs and thus they were relatively left undisturbed in regards to their confessions.

Difference of confession between the majority of the Baluch and the Iranian state have not been a major problem for the Baluchi. Nor have the Baluchi been barred from practicing their interpretation of Islam in Iran. In general Baluchi complaints resemble the complaints of Shiites or other ethnic groups, including Persians, against the Iranian government. Moreover, regardless of their ethnicity or their views on Islam, the main localized complaint of the residents of Sistan-Baluchistan has been underdevelopment in their province’s rural areas. In contrast to the pictures being linked to Jundallah, Sistan-Baluchistan has enjoyed peace and stability, except for the narcotic smuggling that has involved transient elements from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Baluchi Independence: Iran’s Problem or Pakistan’s Problem?

Aside from the opium wars between Iranian security forces and a multi-national narcotic smuggling network assisted by vast sections of the security and state apparatus of Pakistan, the greatest source of antagonism in the region of Baluchistan has been specific to the Pakistani side. Although the Baluchi are not a confessional minority in the mostly Sunni Muslim country of Pakistan, the Baluchi have been marginalization in Pakistan. This, however, should not be overstated either, but has resulted in a real and widely supported nationalist and secessionist movement in Pakistani Baluchistan. The Baluchistan Nationalist Party was formed on this basis and has made demands ranging from full independence from Pakistan to more local autonomy.

Baluchi separatism is not a factor in Iran, but it is a real force in Pakistan. The Baluchistan People’s Front, which from Britain claims to represent the Baluchi in Iran also has no real popular base and is propped up by British and American support, whereas the Baluchistan Nationalist Party has a popular base of support in Pakistan. The Baluch feel they were forced to join Pakistan under pressure, especially in the case of the of the Khanate of Kalat (Qalat). Starting in 1948, Pakistan has seen five rounds of ethnic-based fighting in Baluchistan. Since the creation of Pakistan, the independence movement in Pakistani Baluchistan has gone so far as to openly wage war against the Pakistani government and military. This war between Baluchi fighters and the Pakistani military has been neglected by the same journalists and mainstream media outlets that report on Jundallah synonymously with the allegations of the systematic mistreatment of the Baluch in Iran. In this context, Jundallah’s fighters are mostly imported from Pakistan and the problems of the Baluchi with the Pakistani government have deliberately been imported to Iran.

Misleading the World on Baluchistan

Returning to the question; do the Baluchi as a whole have aspirations to create “Free Baluchistan” or their own state? The answer has been given as no in regards to Iran, but a mixed yes when it comes to Baluchi feelings in Pakistan. Nevertheless, these differences amongst the Baluchi in Iran and Pakistan are generalized as one. This generalization is given so as to vindicate Jundallah as a home-grown Iranian movement that germinated out of the conditions on the ground in Iranian Baluchistan without the involvement of any external powers.

World view is categorically being misled on the Jundallah attacks in Baluchistan. The application of Cartesian Doubt is really needed when a discourse on Baluchistan is presented. Ethnic, religious, and sectarian differences do exist in Iranian Baluchistan as they do everywhere else without exception, but they are not major cleavages or forces of tension in multi-ethnic Iran. Any Iranologist or individual that knows Iran first hand will give this assessment. Tension does exist in Sistan-Baluchistan, but to an equal or far lesser extent than the tensions between the French and the Flemish in Belgium or the Québécois and English-Canadians in Canada.

In the onslaught of the media coverage of the series of attacks in Sistan-Baluchistan against Iranian security targets many journalists have presented the conflict as being one between Shiite Muslims and Sunni Muslims and one for Baluchi rights. For example, in the process Le Figaro, an influential French newspaper, has described the situation as one where a Sunni minority is fighting for their rights in the most generic and non-context specific terms. Not only are these reports being made in Lebanon by individuals with little expertise or knowledge about Iran, but misleadingly the small force that is Jundallah and the Baluchi peoples are systematically being equated as one entity. The heavy influence of the same rhetorical tactics used in favour of the March 14 Alliance in Lebanon and used to describe the so-called Shiite-Sunni tensions (which are really political tensions between the Future Movement and Hezbollah) in Lebanon are evident in the reports that are presented by Le Figaro without any real understanding for Baluchistan.

In Saudi Arabia, where sectarian hate has been heavily enforced by the Saudi media, the attacks in Baluchistan are being presented as Sunni Muslims fighting Shiite repression. Another example of misinformation comes from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The BBC has steadily moved to a position where it has described the attacks in Baluchistan as attacks that have been perpetrated by an ethnic militia fighting for minority rights. Furthermore, while the BBC has generally designated other groups using the same tactics as terrorist organizations it has not done so for Jundallah.

Are the narratives behind the attacks in Baluchistan factual, even in the most subjective of terms? No, nothing can be further from the reality of the situation. It is somewhat of a giveaway that none of these reports even dare to venture into the theme of popular support for the Jundallah attacks by the people of Baluchistan. No exhaustive presentation of the Baluch has even been made. None of these reports even mention that many of the people and targets attacked have included Sunni Muslims. Nor is anything mentioned about the evidence Iran has provided to the United Nations, starting in 2007, validating Tehran’s claims of American and British involvement.

Spawn of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI): the Taliban, Sipah-e-Sahaba, and Jundallah

So what is Jundallah? ABC News (“The Secret War Against Iran,” April 3, 2007), based on reports from Pakistani intelligence sources in 2007, identified Jundallah as clearly being Pakistani in origin and American-supported. Iranian officials have also said the group is alien to Iran. In 2007, at the same time information began to emerge that the White House was supporting terrorist organizations and activities against Iran. The Telegraph (“Bush sanctions ‘black ops’ against Iran,” May 7, 2007), amongst numerous other sources, also reported that the U.S. government was funding Jundallah as part of a regime change agenda against Iran, because a war with Iran was not possible at the time. These operations are part of what can be called a “soft war.”

To hide and whitewash Jundallah’s Pakistani origin and its creation as an organization clearly for the purpose of destabilizing the Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan, the objectives of Jundallah were finessed to fit an Iranian format. The U.S. and Britain, with Pakistan as their surrogate, also began to realize that the separatist causes and organizations they had been assembling and supporting to destabilize and balkanize Iran were garnishing little support inside Iran or internationally. In an attempt to connect its operations with the broader demands for reform in Iran, Jundallah’s aims started being presented as part of a battle for Baluchi civil rights instead of its previous pretext of fighting Shiite Muslims in a hardcore sectarian war. The organization also changed its name to the People’s Resistance Movement of Iran to distance itself from a separatist identity that the Baluchi in Iran did not support.

There is something fundamentally contradictory between Jundallah’s claims of fighting for Baluchi civil rights and its systematic attacks on civilian targets, which included ethnic Baluch, and public places. A look at Jundallah’s leader also presents contradictions. Abdul-Malak Rigi is a former Taliban fighter and a smuggler involved in the international narcotics drug ring that is active on the borders of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. Rigi a narcotics trafficker with a criminal record has been presented as a political activist in places like the U.S., Britain, and Saudi Arabia. This is highly improbable. Little analysis is made on these linkages.

Jundallah not only has Taliban fighters in its ranks, but also members of Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba. Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba or Sipah-e-Sahaba is a former and small political party in Pakistan that was involved in attacks against Pakistani Shiite Muslims and Christians, but with the main objective of eliminating Shiites. The group shares a lot of ground with the Taliban of pre-2001 Afghanistan in regards to its use of violence, its world-view, and its intolerance against Shiite Muslims, Christians, and Jews. The transfer of Sipah-e-Sahaba fighters into the ranks of Jundallah to attack Iran is not implausible. In fact, the Pakistani government has also admitted that Lashkar-e-Jhangavi, a so-called splinter group that broke from Sipah-e-Sahaba, is part of Jundallah and Jundallah’s attacks on Iran.

Jundallah is a modified face of Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Taliban. The group would not be able to attack the Iranian police, the Iranian border guard, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard without help from the state apparatus of Pakistan or the collusion of the occupying powers in Afghanistan. This is one of the reasons that Jundallah fighters have escaped so easily into Pakistan from the Iranian border without problems with Pakistani security forces and border guards. It must also be mentioned that there are several American bases in Pakistani Baluchistan in close proximity to Iran that Jundallah could be using for support in its cross-border raids of Iran.

The truth behind so-called Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan is mostly linked to a nexus of destabilization, war, and the narcotics trade. The original Taliban (which does not include many of the different groups fighting NATO in Afghanistan), Jundallah, and Sipah-e-Sahaba are all the spawn of the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) in one way or another. All three originate in Pakistan and all of them have the hallmarks of entities created by the ISI. All three are also tied in one form or another to the international narcotics trade of opiates, such as opium and heroin. Narcotics have been involved through drug money with the funding of these organizations, as well as the Pakistani military and the personal wealth of many Pakistani leaders.

The Talibanization of Pakistan, however, is exceptional in regards to being a direct spawn of Pakistani intelligence operations. The new Taliban in Afghanistan and the Tehrik-e-Taliban in Pakistan or the Pakistani Taliban are not like the old pre-2001 Taliban. The motivations and origins for the latter two groups are different. Most the new Taliban in Afghanistan do not share the same ideology as the old Taliban and are fighting against what they see as a foreign invasion of Afghanistan. In regards to the Taliban in Pakistan, in a sense they are the blowback of Pakistani meddling in Afghanistan and a result of the American-led NATO war in Afghanistan. Demands for a united Pashto state are also at play in the formation of the Pakistani Taliban.

Tehran has accused Islamabad several times of supporting Jundallah and operations against Iran. The Iranian government has also demanded that the Pakistani government hand over Rigi for the murder of Iranian citizens and officials, including high ranking Iranian Revolutionary Guard commanders. Islamabad denies working with Jundallah. Pakistan has supported Jundallah, but the extent to which it has is not clear. In fairness it must be said that the widespread corruption in the ranks of Pakistan’s security, intelligence, and military forces is another factor at play. Pakistan itself is a victim of the collaboration of its leaders and officials with America and its allies. It can be said that Pakistan is not a state with a military, but a military with a state. A vast mosaic of the Pakistani military and officialdom act on their own and are involved in the international drug industry. These individuals and groups can easily act by themselves and even against Pakistani national interests. It is the U.S. and Britain, however, which have used the corrupt officialdom and state apparatus of Pakistan as an incubator for their geo-political objectives in Eurasia.

The original Taliban and organizations like Jundallah ultimately serve the interests of America and its allies in Eurasia. Pakistan has merely acted as an agent for the interests of America and its allies. This is one of the reasons that the U.S. State Department has never put Islamabad on its list of states sponsoring terrorism even though India and other states have provided strong cases.

Eurasian Geo-Strategy: Why Destabilize Eastern Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan?

A strong, stable, and powerful Pakistan, especially one that would be independent, is not looked at in good terms by the Pentagon and NATO for many reasons. Within an Orwellian framework, Pakistan and NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan are deliberately being destabilized while there is talk about stabilizing them. Many Pakistani elites are party to this agenda.

Both Afghanistan and Pakistan act as a land bridge between Iran on one side and China and India on another. If Pakistan and Afghanistan were to fall under the orbit of Russia, China, and Iran as the Pentagon and NATO (the Periphery) fear then Central Asia would virtually be encircled and closed off to America and its allies. In addition to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Republic of Azerbaijan would complete the encirclement of Central Asia and its energy resources. This last point involving Baku, however, depends on the status of the Caspian Sea, which is why Russia and Iran want the Caspian Sea to be closed off and have liberum vetoes over any development in its waters. It is, therefore, through Afghanistan and Pakistan that the U.S. and its allies have a land bridge into Central Asia and the centre of the Eurasian landmass.

The destabilization project in Afghanistan and Pakistan is aimed at specific areas in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as political and national unity. Ethnic divisions are being magnified in both. The answers to this come down to the struggle over Eurasia and the encirclement of Russia, China, and Iran. In this context, not only is the securing of energy resources in Central Asia tied to the industrial and economic needs of America and its partners, but also as a means to keep these resources out of the hands of China, Russia, and Iran for use, distribution, or transit. This is why an energy corridor from Turkmenistan to the shores of the Indian Ocean, going through Afghanistan and Pakistan has been an objective of the Pentagon and NATO linked to the issue of energy security.

In regards to strategic energy routes, the Pentagon and NATO see the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) Friendship Pipeline as a threat or rival energy corridor. There is a strong possibility that China could be included in the pipeline or that the pipeline could be just an Iran-Pakistan-China pipeline that would bypass India. This is a threat to American ambitions to contain China y way of controlling its energy supplies. It is also seen as a threat by the Pentagon and NATO because the ex-Soviet republics in Central Asia could supply gas to China via Iran and this pipeline. Turkmenistan already has gas pipelines going into Iran. In summary, putting a halt on the IPI Friendship Pipeline is not as important as controlling the energy route and keeping China out of the picture.

Pakistan, as noted, is filled with corrupt leaders. These leaders can easily be bought or switch sides. The fears of the Pentagon and NATO that Islamabad could become a full Chinese client state are driving the project to balkanize Pakistan. The same is true in regards to Afghanistan where NATO and the Pentagon fear that Iran and China could control Afghanistan through spheres of influence that would see a western zone controlled by Tehran and an eastern zone controlled by Beijing. Maps of Pakistan and Afghanistan falling within the geo-political orbit of China have even been produced. Balkanizing these areas makes it much harder for the area to fall under Chinese and Iranian control. Why is this important? The answer goes back to the issue of Pakistan and Afghanistan as land bridges between China and Iran. In a balkanized scenario, where Pakistan and Afghanistan have been divided, there would be less of a likelihood that a geo-strategically significant land bridge would manifest between Iran and China. This would further obstruct Eurasian solidarity and cohesion, which is a major aim of the Pentagon and NATO. Out of its own geo-strategic fears India has also made common cause with the U.S. and NATO in this project to prevent the tightening of the embrace and alliance between Beijing and Tehran.

The balkanization of this area would also make it more probable that the energy routes would be controlled by America and its allies via the new and smaller states that may ask for the protection of America and NATO like some of the states of the former Yugoslavia. The balkanization of Pakistan and Afghanistan also would help destabilize the easternmost Iranian provinces, including Sistan-Baluchistan. An independent Pakistani Baluchistan could also be at odds with Tehran over territorial claims to the Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan. In addition, an important question is would an independent Baluchistan serve or work against Chinese naval interests in Gwadar. The military infrastructure of the area is already under the control of the American military.

Baluchistan is not only geo-strategically important in regards to Eurasian energy linkages, but is also rich in mineral deposits and energy reserves. In most cases these minerals and energy reserves are all untouched. It would be far easier to procure the mineral and energy resourses of this area from a relatively more lightly populated Baluchistan republic.

The Return of the Realists in U.S. Foreign Policy: Obama White House involved in Baluchistan?

With the replacement of George W. Bush Jr. with Barack H. Obama Jr. it can heuristically be said that the realists of U.S. foreign policy came back into power, whereas the neo-conservatives or neo-cons were in power in the Bush Jr. Administration. In reality both were involved to different degrees. Conceptually, realists do not believe that there are morals in international relations, just interests. Amongst the realist camp are Henry A. Kissinger and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski.

American foreign policy realists are not different in their foreign policy objectives, just different in their methodologies. The use of military force for them is just as important as the neo-cons. The realists are known for negotiating with their geo-political rivals, but covertly work to destabilize rivals. The history of Afghanistan and Brzezinski’s involvement there against the Soviet Union during the Cold War is just one example.

So is the Obama Administration involved in the attacks on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard conference in Sistan-Baluchistan? One of the main forces behind the foreign policy of President Obama is Brzezinski, a realist and someone who has talked about Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan all becoming destabilized, including in front of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 2007. The concept of a geo-political “black hole” is also his. Also, the Iranian government has categorically stated that the U.S. and Britain where the forces behind the October 18, 2009 attacks on a dialogue amongst Sistan-Baluchistan’s Shiite Muslim and Sunni Muslim leaders sponsored by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Most likely the answer is yes. While the U.S. government is also negotiating with Tehran, America has not ended its covert meddling and destabilization operations against Iran. Barack Obama is continuing the last American administration’s proxy war on Iran from the Iranian border with Iraq to Sistan-Baluchistan.

Note: The following map was prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters. It was published in the Armed Forces Journal in June 2006, Peters is a retired colonel of the U.S. National War Academy. (Map Copyright Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters 2006).

Although the map does not officially reflect Pentagon doctrine, it has been used in a training program at NATO’s Defense College for senior military officers. This map, as well as other similar maps, has most probably been used at the National War Academy as well as in military planning circles.

Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya is a writer specializing in Middle Eastern and Central Asian affairs, based in Ottawa. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).
Courtesy: The Global Research.ca

Pakistan’s Other Problem Area: Baluchistan
By ISHAAN THAROOR

When the world looks at Pakistan, its attention justifiably focuses on the rugged northern border with Afghanistan, a nexus of Taliban activity and the site of an ongoing multi-pronged campaign against the militants. Battling jihadism there is a pivotal plank in the Obama administration’s plans to stabilize the war-ravaged region and eventually dial down America’s military presence.
But in the shadow of this “Af-Pak” frontier, another conflict has grown new life in recent years and, according to experts, poses a possibly greater existential threat to the Pakistani state. The province of Baluchistan, situated along Pakistan’s west and northwest borders with Iran and Afghanistan, comprises more than 40% of Pakistan’s landmass but less than 5% of its people. Its unforgiving deserts nearly annihilated the armies of Alexander the Great as they marched home. The native Baluch, descendants of nomadic tribes who roamed these arid wastes, number around five million and have for years complained of marginalization and mistreatment, particularly at the hands of the Pakistani military.

Beneath their homeland’s soil lies a treasure trove of natural gas and oil reserves, which, while largely untapped, yield revenues from which the Baluch feel excluded. Successive generations have waged armed rebellions against Pakistani rule — in 1948, 1953, through the 1960s and 70s, and now. According to analysts, continued abuses at the hands of security forces and Pakistan’s shadowy intelligence agency, the ISI, have intensified separatist feeling to an unprecedented scale. “Baluch nationalism is more broad-based, is a more serious phenomenon than at any time in the past,” says Selig Harrison, a leading authority on the Baluch and director of the Center for International Policy in Washington.
The dimensions of the Baluch struggle are made all the more complicated by the region’s political geography. Around a million ethnic Baluch live on the other side of the border in Iran and there, too, have long agitated against a repressive state for greater freedoms. During Pakistan’s most brutal crackdown on Baluch separatists in the 1970s — when civilians reportedly died in the thousands — Iran lent Pakistan logistical support, including helicopters. At the time, the two countries were allied together under the U.S.-led CENTO Cold War pact, but following Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 relations changed, with Tehran’s Shia establishment increasingly wary of their Sunni counterparts in the Pakistani military leadership. The Iranians loath the Afghan Taliban, who were created in part by elements within the Pakistani state. “There’s an inherent set of tensions [between the two countries] based on their prior strategic choices,” says Sameer Lalwani, a Pakistan watcher at the New America Foundation, a Washington-based think tank.

On Baluchistan, the cooperation of old has shifted to a more guarded mutual distrust. On Oct. 18, Jundullah, a Baluch militia based on Pakistani soil struck the Iranian border city of Pishin, killing 41, including a number of senior figures in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. A week later, Pakistani troops detained 11 Iranian agents who had infiltrated across the border, possibly in a mission aimed against Jundullah. They were eventually released, but the incidents spotlighted the uncomfortable place Baluchistan occupies in both Tehran and Islamabad’s internal affairs — and their dealings with each other.

These tensions may balloon in the future as other regional powers expand their interests in Baluchistan as well. The presence of some 19 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the province has raised the prospect of significant outside investment, but it has only deepened Baluch anxieties of alienation. China has already set about securing access to Baluchistan’s other rich veins of resources: it owns a controlling interest in the massive gold and copper mine at Saindak and has steered the building of a $1 billion blue water port at Gwadar, mostly using Chinese labor. The growing hub of Gwadar, which Islamabad has slated to become a special economic zone, is not only a focal point of Chinese strategic interests in southwest Asia, but also a source of contention for the Baluch, who have been almost entirely frozen out of its development and, as in elsewhere in the province, kept at arm’s length by ethnic Punjabis and Sindhis arriving to do business here from other parts of Pakistan.

Baluch separatists claim that they never wanted to be part of Britain’s partitioning of colonial India into the independent states of India and Pakistan and that they are the victims of an empire that barely ruled them. The border that splits Iranian and Pakistani Baluchistan was a line plotted in 1871 by a British colonial official, ceding territory to Iran’s rulers in a bid to win Tehran’s support against Czarist Russia. Now, the Baluch in Pakistan and Iran who fear independence may be out of reach campaign for expanded freedoms and guarantees to preserve their language and culture within the Pakistani and Iranian states. Others have taken up arms over the years. Suggestions made by some Pakistani officials linking Baluch separatism to the activities of the Taliban are wrong, says Harrison. Baluch nationalism has always been a secular project; its militant fronts warring with Pakistan, like the Baluch Liberation Army, descend from a tradition of Marxist-Leninist guerrillas that took root in the 1970s. Jundullah, though an avowedly Sunni group, articulates its identity as a rejection of the Shia clerics ruling Iran — a political act — rather than one born out any particular fervor.

When trying to discredit Baluch separatism, Islamabad often blames its regional rival, India, for abetting and influencing the rebels. Pakistan’s wariness of India’s hand in its affairs has only grown after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan saw Indian engagement there bloom — Pakistani officials say Indian consulates in the Afghan cities of Kandahar and Jalalabad are behind the destabilizing acts of subversion in Baluchistan. Baluch attacks are frequently followed by Pakistani accusations of Indian involvement, though Islamabad, which has a noted record of being a breeding ground for terrorists who make their way to India, has yet to show any evidence of Indian collusion. Earlier this month, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh rejected any notion of India backing insurgents. “The people and government of Pakistan know jolly well that this is a false accusation,” said Singh.

Meanwhile, Baluchistan simmers. Beyond the standard detachments of border troops, the Pakistani military has kept an occupying army in six major garrisons across the province since 1958. For decades, the Baluch have accused the army of kidnappings, disappearances and extrajudicial killings. In April, three dissident Baluch leaders were reportedly abducted by Pakistani security forces and found days later, their bodies bruised and ridden with bullets, triggering weeks of rioting and violence. A 2008 Amnesty International report, “Denying the Undeniable: Enforced Disappearances in Pakistan,” charted at least 600 unresolved disappearances in Baluchistan alone. The 2006 killing of Akbar Bugti — at the time, the emotive figurehead of Baluch separatism — in a firefight with Pakistani troops gave the current wave of Baluch nationalists a martyred hero to latch onto. “The continued atrocities all over Pakistani Baluchistan has kindled a very strong separatist feeling that will have to be answered,” says Harrison of the Center for International Policy.

In a report published earlier this year, Harrison recommends the withdrawal of a chunk of the Pakistani occupying army and a political solution that grants the province greater autonomy and control over its resources. The Baluch desire for autonomy commands a decent level of sympathy among the Pakistani public, but is a non-starter with the military, who view the province as a vital geopolitical bulwark against Tehran, Kabul or New Delhi’s interests. The political paralysis in dealing with this remote, restive province is another sign, experts say, of the real power the military holds over the country’s weak civilian government. “[Pakistani President Asif ]Zardari and his entourage understand what needs to be done,” says Harrison. “But they have no ability to get the armed forces and the ISI to cooperate.”

The U.S. has remained mostly quiet on the matter, in part because it only has so much leverage that it can wield over the Pakistani military. During the Bush administration, there were suggestions that Washington was even secretly backing anti-Iranian groups like Jundullah and staging covert operations against Iran from Baluchistan. But a more public effort to reach a just solution for Baluch grievances would go a long way toward securing stability for Pakistan in general. The Baluch disturbances have put on hold plans to build a lucrative gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan — a link that would enhance regional cooperation as well as boost the nation’s wealth. Calming separatist passions would also serve as a lesson to the Pakistani military, which, as seen during the traumatic and bloody independence of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), has a habit of trying to brutally stomp out secessionist movements. At a moment when there are so many hearts and minds to be won — and boots on the ground stretched so thin — it wouldn’t hurt to give peace a chance.

The News
Sunday, November 01, 2009
By Gibran Peshimam

Judging by the feedback, the reaction to labelling Balochistan’s fast-deteriorating and drastically-changed situation Pakistan’s chief problem – one that will carry on beyond operations in the Tribal Areas and the NWFP – has met with across-the-board agreement. However, the persisting question is how to tackle the situation.

The need to bring the Baloch nationalists and others stuck in the middle on board is obvious. Yet, the question of how and whether any measure will earn the trust of these elements remains highly debatable. For starters, let it be known that what needs to be done now is obviously diametrically opposed to what is being done now and has been done in the past in Balochistan. That is, Islamabad needs to push boundaries, break stereotypes and think out-of-the-box.

Big. Long-term. Enduring.

No status quo, not even hybrids (ala the trademark ‘three pronged’ proposals of a certain London-residing retired general). No, those will not do. More of the same in terms of policy means more of the same in terms of results. That’s a time-tested policy. We need pristine. The good stuff. Uncut, unadulterated.

In short, unprecedented.

Any compromise has to begin with the release of the ‘missing’ people, a large chunk of who are activists or sympathisers of the Baloch nationalist movement. Releasing them unconditionally, in a dignified manner possibly with an overarching apology, would send the right signals to begin with. You cannot say that you sincerely want to work with the nationalists while keeping them habeas corpus in a practice that is against all civilised norms.

This is just the beginning of the appeasement process. We need more drastic steps. This would, as mentioned earlier, entail engaging the true representatives of Balochistan.

Call on Brahmdagh Bugti. While he may not hold as much clout as the establishment alleges he does, the point is that he is the default protagonist-in-chief of the Baloch resistance. But this, needless to say, will be difficult.

In a recent interview, the young Bugti, alleged to be operating from Kabul, shows that he is in no mood for reconciliation. And why should he be? According to reports, he was there when his grandfather, the indomitable Nawab Akbar Bugti, was killed in the mountains by the state of Pakistan.

Before that, in 1959, Babu Nowroz, one of the original Baloch nationalists, was called down from the mountains with his companions, including his sons, to negotiate after those in power swore on the Holy Book that they would not be arrested. They were. And then hanged.

Nawroz’s death penalty was later turned into a life imprisonment, owing to his age.

So when Brahmdagh says, “If someone expects us to still negotiate with the people who ruined our lives then you are not being fair with us,” he is spot on justified.

To mitigate this, there needs to be a concerted, institutionalised reconciliation process. If the establishment can conjure up an audacious document to give the past plunderers of this country a clean slate to come back and restart their trade, then surely such a concession can be afforded to people who have been suppressed for decades, and whose return is a big part of saving your largest province from brutal secession. Drop the cases of sedition, subversion and other such charges against Brahmdagh, against Hairbayar and Gazin Marri and other Baloch leaders. This should be approved unconditionally by parliament and made into law instantly. The BRL – the Balochistan Reconciliation Law.

To show even more sincerity, pull out the armed forces from the areas where these leaders will be returning to. Call in the United Nations. Let them come in and handle their return to ensure that any sign of mistrust is mitigated.

They will come. The credibility of coming out into the open, onto Baloch soil, will be a proposition that will definitely attract them. In any case, if Brahmdagh is indeed in Afghanistan as is alleged, then he should know that history shows that the Baloch nationalists have been expelled from there before – Prince Abdul Karim, the brother of the Khan of Kalat – and there is no reason it cannot happen again, especially with a fickle and stretched Washington calling the shots.

Then show them that you are sincere in conceding self-determination. That freedom is possible without complete secession. This will entail constitutional guarantees. Now, this is a process that Pakistan needs to move to regardless of its policy towards Balochistan. The federation has long been struggling under the centralised control policy of Islamabad. What is needed is a step towards a confederational system that goes deeper than just abolishing the Concurrent List, which should have been done a long time ago to begin with.

The constitutional guarantee can take the form of a 50-50 basis sharing formula between the centre and the provinces. That is, 50 per cent of the constitution should be written by the centre, and the rest can be decided by the respective province itself, which should be absolutely free to decide on issues such as employment quotas, investments etc. You want only Baloch to run Baloch affairs, including the law-enforcement agencies? You want a massive chunk of resource revenue? It’s your call. Land ownership, the works.

All this may sound drastic. But what other option is left? If you want to be taken seriously, you have to abandon shallow moves such as conjuring up polished old policies under the garb of fresh initiatives, such as what the Balochistan Package is sure to be.

Of course this is all a moot point if the government doesn’t have the will or the spine to confront tradition and abandon archetype strategies that are more about conceited jingoism than heartfelt patriotism. Sadly, this is probably the case. The government that tries this, or any other drastic last-ditch attempt to win over the trust of the Baloch, will have to be iron-willed.

As it stands, anything less, and the Balochistan Package might as well be categorised as foreign aid.

The writer is city editor, The News, Karachi. Email: gibran. peshimam@gmail.com

Tahir Mohammad Khan

Veteran Tahir Muhammad Khan belongs to a political family of Balochistan. He was deputy chairman Senate and federal minister for Information in Z A Bhutto’s government. He was put behind bars for demanding restoration of democracy during General Zia’s dictatorship. Earlier, he left college teaching to take part in the election campaign of Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah against General Ayub Khan. He was first associated with National Awami Party but later joined PPP in 1969.

The News on Sunday got an opportunity to chat with a busy Tahir Muhammad Khan who is working on more than one book on different aspects of life in Balochistan. Excerpts follow:

The News on Sunday: How did you become interested in politics?

Tahir Mohammad Khan: My family has political roots. Two of my elder brothers joined the nationalist movement in British Balochistan in 1930s. Khan Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai formed the Anjuman-e-Watan Party which, along with reforms, demanded freedom. Most of the educated Pushtoon young men were behind him. The number was not so large whereas loyalist Sardars and Maliks were at the beck and call of British Rulers. Same was the case in Kalat Princely State. The Nawabs were honestly and sincerely camp followers of the Indian Empire. They had bound themselves in stringent treaties. A British agent regulated the affairs of the state and steered the foreign policies. The Kalat National Party (1932) initiated the movement for reforms and throwing away the yoke of slavery. My family having both Baloch and Pushtoon connections was associated with both the parties, whereas both the parties were associated with the Indian National Congress. My brother Mirza Faizullah Khan and Mirza Rehmatullah Khan held offices in Kalat and Kharan States. At the same time, they were office holders in these parties. This family background attracted me to politics.

I started my career as a lecturer, but in 1965, on the eve of the election of Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah (1965), I resigned from my job and joined her election campaign. At that time, a majority of youth were sympathisers of National Awami Party. So was I because, during Ayub Khan’s tenure, Balochistan was governed by a draconian law — the Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR). Therefore, open political party affiliation was not permitted under section 40 FCR. In 1969, some of us joined Pakistan Peoples Party.

TNS: What is the current situation in Balochistan? One gets the impression that the Baloch youth is demanding independence and would not accept anything short of that?

TMK: You are right. Balochistan is going through a turmoil. The Baloch Pushtoon society has opened up. The tribal ties are eroding. Bhutto gave impetus to education, opened schools and colleges almost at tehsil levels. The professionals and graduates have grown diametrically. The youth is unemployed or under-employed. There is agony of joblessness while the world around is glamorous. They can’t reach the goals set for themselves. There are serious impediments including political and executive bottlenecks. This has caused disenchantment. They are just angry young men.

The growth of politics in Balochistan has not been healthy. Both British and Princely Balochistan were poor, totally undeveloped but independent. You couldn’t blame anyone. But, the creation of one unit (1955) snatched everything. It made us totally dependent on Lahore. Everything rolled out from here. No one from Balochistan could reach or could get anything from Lahore. The jobs were lavishly given to people from Punjab. The development programmes could not reach the grassroots. First, the demands had increased; second, the administrative Punjabi machinery was unsympathetic; third, it was dishonest and corrupt. These factors added to miseries leading to frustration. The sheer frustration gave birth to politics of hatred. The hatred devolved and became an epidemic. Balochistan is going through those pangs. The nationalists think that the nail of neo-colonialism is so deeply engraved that it cannot be redeemed without full independence.

TNS: What are the historical reasons — factors which led to this stage?

TMK: When General Yahya Khan restored the provinces, he did not give the same autonomy to the provinces which was taken away in 1955. During the Ayub/Yahya dictatorship, the authority of federal government increased. The concept of a strong centre was not only pleaded but enforced. It was done because the rulers thought the wave of secession of East Pakistan can only be avoided by a rigorous strong centre. This policy was defeated in the 1970 general elections. However, the policy continued in West Pakistan, mainly because the rulers thought there are separatist movements of Pushtoonistan, Sindhudesh and Balochistan. These feeling strengthened two types of movements, increasing militarisation and extending the role of Army through intelligence agencies.

At the same time, it enhanced the fear of the provinces by allowing the agencies, the Anti-Narcotics Force, the induction of Frontier Corps, the Coast Guards and civil administration to yield parallel powers in control of smuggling etc.

These uniformed forces exercised uncontrolled authority in Balochistan. They interfered in the day-to-day life of citizens which created uneasiness. They also fleeced citizens on every level. Over and above, the government also announced construction of cantonments in Gwadar, Pasni, Ormara, Dera Bugti and Kalat. It was also asserted that the existing cantonments will be strengthened. This created threat and fear among the people. The politicians capitalised on these existing fear factors. This has promoted the old, prevailing apprehension — that Pakistan by means of militarisation intends to capture the mineral resources of Balochistan. This mindset activated the youth, women and nationalist forces.

TNS: There are complaints of serious human rights violations, torture and humiliation of people?

TMK: Yes. That is why this independence movement is gaining momentum. The policy of picking, torturing and killing of the activists at the hands of the agencies has given birth to the feeling of revenge. This, in fact, is a reaction to the use of force. This has now seeped into women and children as well.

TNS: Militarisation in Balochistan has created all political problems. How can more militarisation (of people) solve its problems?

TMK: The first military action was taken in Kalat in 1958. It was extended to Marris and Bugtis in 1962 and continued up to 1969. The third action started in 1973 and continued till 1979. But in the thinly populated mountainous Balochistan, the military operation could not achieve one percent of its objectives. Hence, operation is not the solution.

Now the issues are purely political, which cannot be resolved in any other manner except through dialogue and negotiation.

TNS: Can Balochistan survive as an independent state?

TMK: No economic study is undertaken by the locals, nor is there any data with us. The proponents claim that gas, expected oil, copper, marble, tin and nickel are the resources which could maintain Balochistan. But all these activities require 30 years to develop. What about these 30 years? International trade i.e. Gwadar and other parts need another 40-50 years. These are capital-intensive projects, require articulate negotiation and more concessions. Can the new leaders of Balochistan achieve this? It is a mere hypothesis.

TNS: How do you look at the situation in Balochistan in the regional context?

TMK: Pakistan’s strategic importance is thanks to Balochistan. Balochistan has 750 kilometres of coastline in the Arabian Gulf. It is located on the mouth of Strait of Hurmz. (An independent) Balochistan creates an alarm for all small states of Gulf. It might pose a threat for Iran, because of its Baloch entity. An equal number of Baloch lives in Iran where the Baloch nationalism has gained roots. The most important aspect is the rivalry between USA, Russia and China for control of oil and gas of Caspian Sea. Balochistan and its coastline is the only option of trade and access to international markets. Hence, it has an immense strategic importance not only for itself but for Punjab as well. Without Balochistan, Punjab is a landlocked area like Afghanistan, which reduces its international efficacy. The creation of independent Balochistan will provide new dimensions in the region.

TNS: Can there be peace here without peace in Afghanistan?

TMK: Peace in Afghanistan has no nexus with the struggle in Balochistan. The dream of an independent Balochistan is over 80 years old. The Baloch are in search of their identity. They possess territory, they own resources, they have their language and culture, they take pride in their history, unconquered by any one. The creation of Muslim Pakistan was a romantic division; that dream is over. Therefore, the classic nationalism is once again reemerging.

TNS: There is accusation of outside help, particularly from India through Afghanistan?

TMK: There is no direct testimony of any foreign assistance for the movement. The presence of Brahamdagh Bugti is considered an evidence of assistance by the Indians through Afghanistan. It may be true to the extent of keeping the pressure on both India and Afghanistan. But both of them may not like to involve themselves when other international players feel any vacuum.

TNS: Don’t you think mere military might will not solve the issue of Balochistan?

TMK: The active presence of Army and civil armed forces in Quetta and other places is an exhibition of brute force. But, at the same time, it is a sign of weakness because the militants attack those forces without any impunity. It is seriously eroding the myth of the military’s power.

TNS: Quetta is like a cemented fort with a lot of checkposts. Its cantonment does not seem to be a part of the city while people complain about humiliation, army excesses, target-killings and missing persons. Comment.

TMK: The humiliation has been a manner of governance for years. But recently, the FC and the police have indulged cutting moustaches of people, taking off and throwing away regional caps, cutting trousers with scissors, and abusing the people for being Baloch. The reaction, perhaps, was not to the government policy, but to the expression of force by the militants. However, such measures alienate the common Baloch who is not with the militants.

TNS: How do you see the future of the Baloch Liberation Army? Has Baloch tribal leadership, such as Brahamdagh Bugti, any future?

TMK: Bramadagh Bugti is not a Baloch leader. He has yet to establish his credentials. But he is commanding a group of militants, inspired by Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti. They are effective in Dera Bugti District which has been the constituency of Bugti. The tribal leadership yields influence in its tribal territories but all of them do not subscribe to the separatist/militant movement.

TNS: What is your take on Nawab Akbar Bugti’s murder?

TMK: Akbar Khan Bugti has become a classical war hero. He is revered and idolised as a great fighter and a brave soldier of the Baloch. Poems and short stories have been written about his martyrdom. He has left permanent imprints on the Baloch history.

The News on Sunday
November 1, 2009

What is the solution? Has the situation reached a point of no return? While Baloch young boys and girls loath the idea of a solution within Pakistan, senior politicians still talk of political rights and ownership of their resources within the federation

By Adnan Adil
THE NEWS ON SUNDAY

The road from Quetta to Kalat is broken and bumpy, but after a thorough shake-up it takes you to the historical town, a hub of Baloch nationalist movement that was the capital of a semi-autonomous princely state under the British period.

Along the way, graffiti on the walls for Balochistan’s independence, salutation to Baloch leaders killed fighting for independence and abusive slogans against Pakistan and Punjab just give a glimpse of what is actually cooking up in Balochistan and hidden from the eyes of the rest of the country.

Kalat is one main centre of Hindu population in Balochistan. One thousand Hindus have lived there for centuries. They are not very expressive of what is happening to them, but once assured of confidentiality tell their complaints. One common complaint is that young Hindu men are ignored in government jobs. There are only two schools for Hindu community in Kalat city.

The Hindu elders are nostalgic about good old days when it was a city of peace and love. At the time of Partition, Hindu-Muslim riots did not take place in Balochistan. Hindus were free to go everywhere and they used to enjoy picnics in mountains. Local Muslims used to welcome them. Now the situation is quite bad. Thefts and murder are a routine. Violence has become common and widespread. There is lot of population pressure which requires more space for members of Hindu community to build new houses, but out of fear they are not ready to go out in the suburbs and build a new locality.

Another complaint is that there is no writ of the government. The government does nothing for them. A young child of Hindu community was abducted for ransom in the presence of police. A few years ago, a young man of the community was murdered, but police has not yet arrested the accused. The Hindu traders pay extortion money. They are threatened to pay extortion money or face bomb blasts at their shops.

Hindus complain that they do not have access to any high-ranking government officials or public officials. They complain that chief minister and governor of the province do not give them time to present their complaints. Five years have passed but district minority committee has not met. They say they are treated as second-class citizens.

Kalat’s minority community also seems to be unhappy about the joint electorate system. “If we do not vote a candidate in general election, he becomes our enemy.” There is no elected representative of Hindu community in the National Assembly from Balochistan who can raise Hindus’ voice. There are four seats for minorities and all of them get filled from Sindh where Hindus are in a large number. Hindus of Kalat want their candidates to be elected exclusively by the votes of Hindus alone so that they can be answerable to them.

The resentment and anger among Muslims is much more severe than the tongue-in-cheek complaints of the Hindu community. “Gen Musharraf is responsible for fomenting trouble in Balochistan,” says Prince Mohyuddin of Khan of Kalat family. In his sprawling and historical but quite simple fort in Kalat, one is shown the rooms where the Quaid-e-Azam and his sister Fatima Jinnah had stayed before Pakistan came into existence. Prince Mohyuddin says young Baloch boys think Gen Pervez Musharraf was a good man for the Baloch cause as he woke them up by first putting Nawab Khair Bakhsh Mari into jail and then killing Nawab Akbar Bugti.

Prince Mohyuddin says presently there are two forces in Balochistan: resistance-fighters (militants) who rule at night and security agencies that rule in the day. He says Baloch are mentally no more a part of Pakistan. He says Baloch issue has been internationalised and this is likely to remain so for some time. In his view, at the moment the situation has gone out of the hands of Baloch politicians.

The prince of Kalat appears to be polite with gestures that he is ready to work within the framework of Pakistan, but young men of Kalat are quite blunt and aggressive. Names of most people interviewed have been withheld for their safety. A young boy belonging to Baloch Republican Party-Brahmdagh group, says it would be good for Pakistanis if they grant Baloch independence otherwise to gain it they are ready to die. “Those fighting in mountains are my brothers and my life is not precious than that of Nawab Akbar Bugti or Ballach Mari; I can sacrifice it for independence.”

Young Baloch resent the role of security agencies in Balochistan and claim that they pick up people, torture them and kill them. “They picked up a man and threw his body which had the marks of torture and inscribed on it with a sharp-edged weapon, Pakistan Zindabad.”

A local trader seems a little moderate. He recounts a long list of grievances against the government. “There is no writ of the government. Police do not take action on quarrels among people and thefts. In some case, if police takes action, courts release the accused.” He says there is shortage of patrol in Kalat and other basic requirements. “Kalat-Quetta road is in shambles for the last four years. We do not have maternity homes. Our women observe strict seclusion from men, but circumstances force them to give birth to children in front of strangers on the way to hospitals in Quetta. It hurts our honour.”

A relatively moderate political activist belonging to BNP complains law and order situation in the city is very bad. He says he cannot safely go to his home in suburb, 15 kilometres away from Kalat city. ” Kalat Police has strength of 1000 policemen, but the day a Hindu boy was abducted, there was only one policeman present in the police station. Police could not recover the abducted man. People themselves got him recovered. The CPLC Karachi could not identify the car that was used in the abduction.”

After recounting the grievances, he says, although our young men want independence, but there are many people who want to be a part of Pakistan. In his opinion, if political settlement does not take place soon, the moderate people will also join forces with those demanding for independence.

A local journalist and government employee says Balochistan issue cannot be resolved through chatter but concrete actions to bring Baloch at par with the rest of the country. “We have been kept backward and you can gauge this by one small indicator that there is not a single public park in Kalat or in entire Balochistan.”

There is no girls’ middle school in 12 out of 18 union councils of Kalat, what to speak of a high school for girls. There is only one girls’ high school in the district and that too was established before 1947. This school does not have a single science teacher. There is not a single maternity home in Kalat district.

Baloch activists in Kalat are quite candid about admitting targeted killings being carried out by Baloch nationalists. A political worker says: “People are carrying out targeted killings of settlers because they belong to the community which is committing excesses on Baloch people.” A BSO member says: “In return of the excesses do you expect us to garland you with flowers? It is right to carry out targeted killings in response.” He is quite blunt in abusing Punjabis who in his view have usurped the rights of Baloch people and have forced them to carry out targeted killings.

One bitter complaint is that intelligence agencies are abducting Baloch activists who go missing. For example, they cite the case of one Abdul Mujeeb Baloch son of Abdul Majeed Baloch, who was a unit member of Baloch Students’ Organisation (BSO) Azad in Balochistan University, Quetta and a student of MA in Public Administration. On his way to meeting with the vice-chancellor along with his two colleagues and a professor, he was picked up along with a colleague. The colleague, Abdul Qadir, was released after 25 days. He told us that a federal intelligence agency had abducted and blindfolded them so he did not know where he was detained.

One after another Baloch activists get up and pay tribute to Baloch leaders whom they call martyrs. They consider Balochistan’s minerals are providing a rich resource to run Pakistan, and in return, Pakistan has not given them anything. So, they will not rest until total independence.

What is the solution? Has the situation reached a point of no return? While Baloch young boys and girls loath the idea of a solution within Pakistan, senior politicians still talk of political rights and ownership of their resources within the federation. Prince Mohyuddin was part of Gen Ziaul Haq’s cabinet and had worked to diffuse volatile situation at that time. In his view, in this crisis, veteran politician, Sardar Ataullah Mengal alone has the capacity to bring along both Pushtoons and Balochs and may provide a political solution.

He also suggests that an option is to hand over the province to his political organisation for three years with the following pre-conditions: (a) Militia be taken out of the province though Army may stay here; (b) no more Cantonments be built in the province; (c) all political prisoners be released; and (d) Politicians and bureaucracy from outside not to be part of the provincial administration as outside bureaucracy is too heavy-handed.

Two years in office, the Zardari-Gillani government is making tall claims of bringing some relief for Balochistan, but no measure has been taken so far as the situation is worsening by the day. While the broken and bumpy road from Quetta to Kalat does end up somewhere, it seems the road to and from Islamabad leads to nowhere.